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T he federal government' and virtually all states2 give veterans an
initial hiring preference3 in civil service employment. Such pref-
* Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, Faculty of
Law and Jurisprudence. B.A., University of Colorado, 1960; J.D., State University of
New York at Buffalo, 1971; LL.M., Harvard University, 1974.
1. The primary federal provisions are 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309 and 3313 (1970).
Nondisabled veterans who have passed the qualifying examination receive an additional
five points on their competitive civil service ratings. Those who can establish a service-
connected disability are entitled to a ten-point increment and to an absolute preference
in all positions other than scientific and technical positions rated GS-9 or higher.
Establishment of a "service-connected disability" may entail considerably less thn
a showing of serious physical handicap. Levitan and Cleary report that "[miost veterans
[receiving federal disability payments] were compensated for minor impairments. Forty
percent were deemed to be ten percent disabled, and their impairments to earning
ability were often slight or hardly discernible. Removal of a knee cartilage, amputation
of one finger or a big toe, impaired vision in one eye, dysentery, slight deafness in one
ear, damaged facial muscles or hemorrhoids usually qualified for the minimum disability
rating. Fifty-six percent of veterans on compensation had less than 30 percent disability
in 1971, and were not considered sufficiently handicapped to qualify for vocational re-
habilitation." S. LEVITAN & K. CLEARY, OLD WARS REMAIN UNFINISHED: THE VET-
ERAN BENEFITS SYSTEM 34-35 (1973).
This article will not, however, consider the preferences granted to disabled veterans.
The practice of according special preferences to veterans whose service-connected dis-
abilities do disadvantage them in the labor market presents issues different from those
treated in this paper. To the extent, however, that the "disabled" veterans' preference
is enjoyed by veterans who are not so disadvantaged, the issues do not substantially
differ from those involved in the ordinary veterans' preference.
See also 5 U.S.C. § 3310 (1970), which restricts competitions for the positions of
guards, elevator operators, messengers and custodians to veterans so long as veterans
are available; note 6 infra.
2. For a complete survey, see HousE COMM. ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS, 9 1ST CONG.,
IST SESS., STATE VETERANS' LAWS, DIGESTS OF STATE LAWS REGARDING RIGHTS,
BENEFITS, AND PRIVILEGES OF VETERANS AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (1969). See also R.
KIMBROUGH & J. GLEN, AMERICAN LAW OF VETERANS 1177-1238 (1954). Mississippi
appears to be the only state that does not have a statute providing for some sort of
general preference.
3. The term "preference" is misleading in that it tends to divert attention from
the possible effects of its operation. The veteran does not merely step in line ahead of
the non-veteran to assume one of an endless stream of jobs. When eligible applicants
exceed openings and a non-veteran does not get a position that absent the veterans'
preference he would have been offered, previous military experience is effectively a job
"requirement."
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erences range from the widespread practice of increasing the veteran's
civil service examination score by a specified number of points4 to
the less common grant of an absolute preference' to all veterans who
meet minimum qualifications." The preference can generally be
claimed at any time during the veteran's lifetime and may be invoked
more than once3 After a veteran has secured a civil service job, he
may be entitled to a further preference in promotion8 and is generally
4. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 18540-43, 18937, 18971-77 (West 1963 & Supp.
1975) (10 points for veterans; 15 points for disabled veterans); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
295.07-295.12 (1975) (5 and 10); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2955 (1969) (10 and 15);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 128-15, 128-15.1 (1974) (10); ORE. REv. STAT. § 408.230 (1974)
(5 and 10); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.3 (1969) (10); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-112
(1973) (5% and 10%); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 41.04.010, 73.04.090 (Supp. 1975)
(10%).
5. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 197.45(2) (Supp. 1975).
6. The policy represented by the preference, that of easing a veteran's way into
civil service, may also be effectuated by means more subtle than the bonus-point or
absolute preference. Since such preferences do not generally operate until the veteran
has established the minimum required qualifications for the particular job, the prefer-
ence statute or the civil service administration may make an effort to minimize such
qualifications. Thus, for example, a provision originating in the Veterans' Benefits Act
of 1944 provides that:
The Civil Service Commission or other examining agency may not pre-
scribe a minimum educational requirement for an examination for the com-
petitive service except when the Commission decides that the duties of a
scientific, technical or professional position cannot be performed by an in-
dividual who does not have a prescribed minimum education. The Commission
shall make the reasons for its decision under this section a part of its public
records.
5 U.S.C. § 3308 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 27, 1944, ch. 287, § 5, 58
Stat. 388). Cooper and Sobel comment upon this provision in Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring
and Promotion, 82 HI.v. L. REv. 1598, 1670 n.2 (1969).
Similarly, even without statutory authorization or requirement, the civil service
administration can lower or eliminate minimum education and experience requirements
and can lower the passing examination grade or even eliminate it entirely. See, e.g.,
Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969).
7. But see N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 85(4) (McKinney 1973).
8. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 295.09 (West 1975); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch.
31, § 3(g) (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 197.45(2) (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 128-15 (1974). Promotional preferences have proved more susceptible to simple
equal protection challenge than have initial hiring preferences. See text accompanying
notes 42-74 infra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a promotional preference
in Commonwealth ex rel. Mauer v. O'Neil, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382 (1951), discussed
in text accompanying note 66 infra, and the Arizona Supreme Court suggested that it
would find such a preference constitutionally deficient in Parrack v. Ford, 68 Ariz. 205,
203 P.2d 872 (1949). Promotional preferences have, however, been sustained in
Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976
(1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 312-13, 381-82 infra; McNamara v. Di-
rector of Civil Serv., 330 Mass. 22, 110 N.E.2d 840 (1953); and State ex rel. Higgins
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Conn. 102, 90 A.2d 862 (1952).
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accorded greater job security than his non-veteran counterpart. The
grounds for a veteran's discharge may be narrowly limited.9 In times
of retrenchment, he may be, by statute, the last to lose his job.*
Federal, state, county and municipal governments employ more
than 14.5 million people, or 19 percent of all employed persons." In
a period in which the private employment picture has been less thafi
promising, federal employment figures have remained stable while state
and local government has grown substantially. There are presently
almost 12 million state and local government employees, an increase
of nearly four million since 1965. It is expected that this trend will
continue.12 Additionally, in many professions there are few or no pri-
vate sector alternatives. Most school teachers and librarians, for ex-
ample, must seek government employment. 13
Veterans constitute a class that is overwhelmingly male: 98 percent
of all veterans are male.' 4 Veterans form a very substantial part of the
male work force; approximately 40 percent of all males over 18 have
experienced military service sufficient to qualify them for the federal
veterans' preference. 5 In view of the sexual imbalance within the
class of veterans and the frequency of the preferred characteristic
among working-age males, it seems clear that the preference necessarily
has a marked differential sexual impact in competitions for those civil
service jobs which are sought by both men and women.
9. See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS § 35.402 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 197.46
(West Supp. 1977).
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 305 (1960); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30,
§ 9A (West 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:16-1 to 16-5 (West 1968); N.Y. Civ.
SERV. LAW § 85(7) (McKinney Supp. 1975). In New York, for example, a disabled
veteran receives sixty months added seniority. A nondisabled veteran is given thirty
months extra seniority.
11. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES
272 (1975).
12. See House EDUCATION & LABOR Com., REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 1746,
Tim EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, H.R. Doc. No, 92-238, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
13. This point is made by O'Neil, Politics, Patronage and Public Employment,
44 U. C. L. Rav. 725, 727 (1975).
14. Males constitute 98.1 percent of all veterans, females 1.9 percent. As of June
30, 1975, there were 29,459,000 veterans, of whom 562,000 were female. ADMINISTRA-
TOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT, YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1975 [hereinafter
cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
15. S. LEVITAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 4. See also ANNUAL REPORT at 3
(reporting that 45 percent of all males 20 years and older in the civilian noninstitu-
tional population in March 1975 were veterans). Using the lower percentage reported
by Levitan and Cleary, it would seem that roughly .75 percent of the females over 18
are so qualified.
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The existence of such a differential impact seems to run against
the tide of recent constitutional 0 and statutory developments17 in-
tended to provide disadvantaged groups with, at the very least, a neu-
tral context in which to strive for economic equality. Conditioning a
public job upon a relatively unrelated experiential qualification from
which women have long been restricted by law I and social mores 9
would seem the very sort of a discrimination that fair employment
practice laws were intended to reach. The major federal provision,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20 has, however, a saving
clause2l which would appear to exempt veterans' preferences from the
statute's otherwise general prohibition of sex discrimination in em-
ployment.22
This article will examine the veterans' preference in terms of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause 8 and in the course
16. See text accompanying notes 278-98 infra and cases discussed therein. See also
Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (invalidating teachers'
forced maternity leave as violative of due process).
17. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1974), discussed in text accompanying
notes 77-107 infra, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1965). See also
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1975).
18. See text accompanying notes 246-51 infra.
19. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). See text accompanying notes 77-107 infra.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 (1970).
22. An argument may be made that the clause does not preserve state public em-
pl6yment preferences. This possibility is explored and rejected in Section II. See text
accompanying notes 86-93 infra. Such a saving clause does not, however, appear in
most state fair employment laws. Regarding the possibility of interpreting state fair
employment laws implicitly to repeal veterans' preference statutes, see note 93 infra.
23. With respect to other possible constitutional infirmities, it has been argued
that the preferences run afoul of art. I, § 9, cI. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be
granted by the United States") and art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall . . . grant any
Title of Nobility") of the Constitution. See Comment, Titles of Nobility and the Prefer-
ential Treatment of Federally Employed Military Veterans, 19 WAYN. L. Rnv. 1169
(1973). Attempts also have been made to invoke due process. For example, in Anthony
v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 394-410 infra, plaintiffs, although relying primarily on the equal protection clause,
argued that the preference was violative of procedural due process in that it created
"irrebuttable presumptions" often contrary to fact: awarding a lifetime employment
preference to veterans assumed that every veteran applicant "served in reliance upon
the prospect of the preference or deserves a reward or needs rehabilitation or reinte-
gration," and that "for no experience ... [non-veterans] may have endured or societal
contribution they may have made are they entitled to any reward or are they in need
of rehabilitation and reintegration into the community and work force." Brief for
Plaintiff at 191, 202-04.
If rehabilitative purpose alone were the state's announced goal, utilization of the
fact of service as a conclusive measure of individual need for rehabilitation might be
sufficiently overinclusive to raise this somewhat questionable due process objection. See
generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-77 (1975). (Note that underinclusiv-
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of such examination will explore (1) the history of veterans' public
employment preferences; (2) the conceptual relationship between the
operation of the preference and employer behavior prohibited by fair
employment laws; (3) the development and demise of a sui generis
approach to equal protection challenges to de facto24 discrimination
in public employment; (4) whether the preference should, for equal
protection purposes, be treated as de facto or de jure (that is, explicitly
sex-based discrimination); (5)' the choice and application of available
standards of constitutional review; and, finally, (6) recent litigation
challenging state preferences as sexually discriminatory.
B. A Brief Overview of Veterans' Benefits
It seems fair to say that this country tries to take good care of its
veterans. Federal benefits designed to compensate for individual ser-
vice-connected loss include disability payments, hospital care, unem-
ployment insurance, reemployment rights and survivors' compensation.
Other benefits are granted perhaps partially to compensate for some
less tangible loss but primarily to reward a class that is perceived as de-
serving: pensions to aged veterans and veterans disabled in civilian
life, hospital care for non-service-connected disabilities, employment
programs, and housing and education subsidies. Benefits and rights
ostensibly designed to faciltate the veteran's return to civilian life in-
clude a minimum of 26 weeks of unemployment insurance, the "GI
Bill" academic and vocational training program, a reemployment and
restricted discharge right in the veteran's former civilian job, priority
in manpower training programs, exclusive rights to certain federal
jobs, priority in job openings with government contractors and sub-
ity, however, is not constitutionally objectionable. The state need not respond to all
needs for rehabilitation and reintegration, from whatever cause, but is free to focus
on need arising from one particular cause-for example, military service-at a time.
Compare the majority opinion in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974), with
Justice White's dissent, id. at 360-62.) In view of the state's reward rationale, however,
it is difficult to discern why the preference for veterans is overinclusive. In any case,
this argument seems to add nothing to plaintiffs? primary equal protection argument.
24. In this article the term "de facto discrimination" will be used interchangeably
with "impact discrimination" to connote instances in which facially neutral employ-
ment criteria disproportionately exclude applicants of a particular group historically
subject to de jure discrimination, for example, explicitly sex-based or racial discrina-
tion. To illustrate the distinction, the notice "No women or blacks need apply" is
de jure race and sex discrimination. The requirement that all applicants achieve a
certain score on a written examination and be at least 5' 8" in height may operate dis-
proportionately to exclude blacks and women, respectively. If so, this is de facto dis-
crimination and may or may not be unlawful. For a more extensive discussion, see
text accompanying notes 79-86 & 94-107 infra.
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contractors, and a point preference on civil service exams (five points
for nondisabled veterans and ten points for disabled veterans).2 5
State benefits28 include mustering-out bonuses, 27 burial benefits, 28
relaxed rules for professional and occupational qualification,29 exemp-
tion from payment of license fees and real property taxes,8 0 priority in
state sponsored housing projects,3 1 special assistance for needy vet-
erans32 as well as those disabled by service-connected illness or injury,13
maintenance of special state homes and hospitals for veterans 4 and
hiring,3 5 promotion 36 and retention3 7 preferences in state and local
employment.
Most of the civilian readjustment benefits are of relatively recent
vintage. The "GI Bill" educational benefits, the availability of un-
employment benefits, and counseling, guidance, and placement ser-
vices originated in the Servicemen's Readjustment 88 and Veterans'
Preference Acts of 1944.39 Manpower and government contractor pro-
visions were developed during the Vietnam War era.40 The situation
today is considerably different from that which may have prompted
many state legislatures to enact veterans' employment preferences in
the period between the Civil War and World War I. While some
25. See generally S. LEVITAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1; R. KIMBIROUOH & J.
GLEN, supra note 2; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14.
26. See generally note 2 supra.
27. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-140a to 27-140n (West 1975); MicH.
CoMP. LAWS §§ 35.1001-11 (Supp. 1976) (giving a $500 bonus to combat veterans
and $15 per month for each month served-up to a maximum of $450-for other
veterans).
28. See, e.g., ARIz. R . STAT. §§ 11-311 to 11-313 (Supp. 1975); CAL. MIL. &
VET. CODE §§ 929, 940-50, 960-62 (West 1955); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 34, §§ 6201-11
(Supp. 1976); 16 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1908-11, 5109-11, 8062-64 (Purdon
Supp. 1976).
29. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT, §§ 51-83 (1960), 20-147, 20-248, 20-256 (West
1969) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:22-12(g) (West Supp. 1975).
30. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 427 (West Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 59, § 5, cl. 22 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
31z See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 121B, § 32 (West Supp. 1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1666 (Purdon 1964).
32. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 101-10, 151-54 (1964); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 40, § 5(11) (West Supp. 1975); MicH. CoMiP. LAws ANN. §§ 35.21-
27, 35.601-08, 35.609-10, 35.651-53 (1967 & Supp. 1976).
33. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 115, § 6B (West 1969); N.Y. ExEc.
LAW §§ 362-64 (McKinney 1972).
34. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5907.01 to 5907.07 (Page 1954).
35. See notes 4 & 5 supra.
36. See note 8 supra.
37. See note 10 supra.
38. Ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
39. Ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
40. See S. LEvrrAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 124, 133-46.
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attention had previously been directed to the needs of disabled vet-
erans of the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, enactment of state
employment preferences represented the first substantial effort to re-
spond to the claims of able-bodied veterans.
In comparison with later expressions of popular gratitude, the
preference is not a genuine "benefit" at all. Unlike true "benefits,"
which draw their substance from the public treasury and impose a
direct detriment on no one, the preference costs the public no money
but imposes a very heavy burden on non-veterans who seek public
employment. The concept was novel41 and caused the state judiciaries
much consternation. In considering the early judicial response to those
who challenged this new development, it is helpful to bear in mind
the novelty of the idea of an employment preference for one group of
citizens, the tension between such a preference and the simultaneously
emerging merit principle of civil service appointment, and the diffi-
culties of testing this novel concept against the recently ratified and,
as yet, little-elaborated and vague standard of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause.
C. Constitutional Challenges
From their inception, state law preferences have been challenged.4
Complainants have generally been male43 non-veterans displaced by
veterans and appointing authorities barred from hiring a non-veteran
believed by the authority to be the best qualified candidate. The
posture of the complainants indicates the nature of the interests as-
serted. The non-veteran claims a right to be free from arbitrary re-
strictions in his pursuit of public employment, and the appointing
authority purports to assert the public interest in securing the best
possible civil servants. While some of the early challengers relied pri-
41. The preference does not seem to have gained currency elsewhere. Telephone
inquiry in Boston and New York to consular officials of Canada, Great Britain, Israel,
Sweden and Germany indicates that the veterans' preference does not exist in those
countries. Compare the German approach of establishing hiring preferences for all the
seriously disabled by setting minimum hiring quotas for the disabled in both public and
private employment. See H. BECKER, THE EMPLOYMENT OF SERIOUSLY DISABLED PER-
SONS (1965).
42. For a listing of cases, see Annot. 161 A.L.R. 494-503 (1946) and 15 AM. JuR.
2d, Civil Service §§ 26-27 (1964).
43. So far there have been only two challenges by women in which the issue of
sexual impact was squarely presented. See Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D.
Pa. 1973), and Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976). These
cases are discussed in Section IX infra. See text accompanying notes 383-411 infra.
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marily upon state constitutional provisions, it is not difficult to recast
the responses of the state court judges in the language of four-
teenth amendment equal protection and substantive due process. The
issues were initially treated in a series of Massachusetts cases, which are
worth examining for their careful consideration of the question and
because they frequently provided the basis for similar results else-
where.4
An 1887 Massachusetts provision exempting veterans of wartime
service from taking civil service examinations was challenged in Brown
v. Russell.45 Brown, a non-veteran, had taken the exam for police
detective and was ranked first on the eligible list. He was later dis-
placed by a veteran who, without examination, was placed at the top
of the list. The court observed that the provision necessarily would
cause the appointment of some unqualified persons, persons who could
not achieve a passing score on the qualifying examination. The issue
was, therefore, narrowly framed in terms of the permissibility of a
legislative requirement that the appointing power fill jobs with veter-
ans regardless of whether they are minimally qualified. The court in-
validated the provision, resting primarily upon the self-evident ob-
servation that it is not in the public interest to permit deviation from
the principle that public jobs should be filled only by those who are
at least minimally qualified. In terms of traditional equal protection
or substantive due process analysis, the Massachusetts court treated the
exemption of veterans from the examination requirement as wholly
irrational in view of the requirement's underlying purpose of exclud-
ing persons not minimally qualified to perform the job.40 This ap-
proach seems to have been adopted by every state court that has con-
sidered the question.4 7
While the Massachusetts court framed the issue in terms of legis-
lative control over the executive, the court's discussion raised many of
the other issues presented by the preference. Chief Judge Field, writing
for a unanimous court, expressed concern that the class of eligible
veterans was dosed to some through no fault of their own because the
44. See, e.g., People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 594, ,105 N.E. 1, 7
(1914); Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68 Kan. 765, 770-75, 75 P. 1034, 1036-37 (1904);
Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 576-79, 3 A.2d 701, 705-06
(1938); State ex rel. Raines v. Seattle, 134 Wash. 360, 376-77, 235 P. 968, 974 (1925).
45. 166 Mass. 14,43 N.E. 1005 (1896).
46. See note 114 infra.
47. For extensive discussion, see Higgins v. Civil Service Comm., 139 Conn. 102,
90 A.2d 862 (1952); Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d
701 (1938), and cases cited therein.
[Vol. 26
VETERANS' PREFERENCE
preference's wartime service requirement was (happily) not so easily
satisfied then as it has been in our century.48 The court questioned the
assertion that military service is in itself an incomparably valuable
job qualification and expressed doubt regarding a rule that would as-
sume job relatedness without taking into account the nature of the
veteran's military experience as well as the particular civil service job
in question. The court noted that "[o]ne, and perhaps the chief, pur-
pose of the exemption must be to reward veterans for their services in
the war of the Rebellion. ' 49 Conceding that the state could constitu-
tionally reward veterans with pensions and bonuses, the court never-
theless advanced two reasons for questioning the use of civil service
jobs as a medium of reward: first, such a system is inconsistent with
the primary purpose of civil service, which is to hire the most quali-
fied applicants; and second, some non-veterans are excluded because
they lack a requirement that is not necessarily job-related and that
without personal fault they are unable to acquire.50
The court considered the initial statute,51 which had only given
a preference when all other things were equal, and observed that it
might have been constitutional, since military experience could rea-
sonably be believed to have some marginal utility and because it is
also possible to identify some degree of public purpose in rewarding
those who have served the state; that is, such rewards tend to promote
the future patriotic endeavors of others.52 The court also suggested
that it might sustain a statute that allowed but did not require the
appointing authority to appoint veterans without examination, be-
cause the appointing authority presumably would exercise his dis-
cretion solely with a view to the needs of the civil service.58
48. 166 Mass. at 16, 43 N.E. at 1006.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 17, 43 N.E. at 1006.
51. The original 1884 statute gave "preference in appointments to office and pro-
motions in office (other qualifications being equal) to applicants who served in the
army or navy of the United States in time of war and have been honorably discharged
therefrom." Act of June 3, 1884, ch. 320, § 14, cl. 6, 1884 Mass. Acts 346.
52. 166 Mass. at 23-24, 43 N.E. at 1009. Having identified this alternative legisla-
tive goal, should the court have upheld the challenged exam exemption provision on
the ground that it too would promote patriotism? The court's decision not to do so does
not necessarily reflect the application of dubious principles of substantive due process. The
court may have adjudged the goal of promoting patriotism too far removed from the
means of giving a preference to support the preference when it was inconsistent with
the other legislative goal of securing qualified civil service personnel, although accord-
ing the patriotism goal some marginal substance when the nature of the preference was
consistent with civil service goals.
53. The court later made a more definitive statement to this effect in Opinion of
the Justices, 166 Mass. 589, 596, 44 N.E. 625, 627 (1896).
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Later that year the court issued an advisory opinion to the gov-
ernor,5 in which it approved, four to three, a provision granting vet-
erans who had passed the appropriate test a "preference to all other
persons, except women."'55 The majority, which included Justices
Field and Holmes, attributed two alternative permissible purposes to
the legislature:
The General Court [the legislature] may have . . . thought
either that such a person would be likely to possess courage, con-
stancy, habits of obedience and fidelity, which are valuable qualifica-
tions for any public office or employment, or that the recognition
of the services of veterans in the way provided for by the statute
would promote that love of country and devotion to the welfare of
the State which it concerns the Commonwealth to foster.56
The minority would have held the provision unconstitutional.
They treated the preference as just one additional civil service rule and
felt that such rules have only one legitimate object, the selection of
the best qualified applicant. They insisted on a close match between
the purported job qualification-military service-and the actual civil
service job requirements.57 The minority opinion also pointed out a
tension between one of the fundamental principles of civil service ap-
pointment procedure and the concept of the veterans' preference,
which arises from the difference between relative and absolute job
qualification. This distinction has invariably been ignored by sustain-
ing courts,5" which generally stress that the veteran is "qualified" in
some absolute sense because he has passed the test. Yet civil service
appointment methodology recognizes an absolute standard only in
54. Opinion of the Justices, 166 Mass. 589, 44 N.E. 625 (1896).
55. Mass. Stat. 1896, ch. 517, §§ 2, 6. That provision, now codified as MAss. GVN.
LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West Supp. 1976), remains essentially unchanged today,
save that the phrase "except women" has been, ironically, dropped to conform with the
letter of the state antidiscrimination law. As section 2 of the original statute tends to
indicate, the intent of the "except women" proviso was to preserve the appointing au-
thority's capacity to request women for certain jobs, rather than to assure equal em-
ployment opportunities for women. Subsequent recodilications make this point clear.
See, e.g., Stat. 1954, ch. 627, § 5; MAss. GN. LAws ANN. ch. 31, § 23 note (West
1966) (Legislative History).
56. 166 Mass. at 595, 44 N.E. at 627.
'57. Id. at 599-600, 44 N.E. at 628-29. Compare the Supreme Court's similar
approach to Title VII cases in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 94-100 infra.
58. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 573-80, 3
A.2d 701, 704-07 (1938). Compare the majority view in Opinion of the Justices, 166
Mass. 589, 594-95, 44 N.E. 625, 626-27 (1896), with that of the minority, id. at 599-
600, 44 N.E. at 628-29.
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disqualification; all qualification is relative. Applicants are given an
examination which is graded on a point basis. Those whose grades
exceed a minimum cutoff point are placed on the eligible list in order
of their examination scores. Applicants from the head of the list are
certified to the appointing authority. When application for a position
is truly competitive, some passing applicants are not certified. Lists
have limited lives and new examinations are held periodically. While
the majority's concept of an absolute and sufficient basic minimum
may represent a defensible alternative to the relative-qualification ap-
proach,5 9 it is not the concept that underlies civil service appointment.
Several decades later the advisory opinion was tested by litigants
in Mayor of Lynn v. Commissioner of Civil Service.60 The Mayor
sought to mandamus the Commissioner to certify for appointment in
the fire department the applicant having the highest score on the
competitive exam. The Commissioner, relying on the preference stat-
ute, certified instead the three highest-standing veterans. The Justices
denied the Mayor's petition and deferred to their illustrious prede-
cessors by adopting without further discussion the majority's view in
the earlier advisory opinion, but they recorded their ambivalence by
noting that "[t]he reasons on the one side and on the other are nearly
evenly balanced." 61
This posture of reluctant approval has proved characteristic of
the Massachusetts court's treatment of the preference. A provision
giving a preference to veterans who received medals of honor from
the President was narrowly construed to exclude those who received
such medals from the Secretary of the Navy.62 When a disabled veteran,
Dr. Klebanoff, asserted his statutory right to absolute preference over
the better qualified Dr. Hutcheson, the appointing authority's choice
for the position of Assistant Commissioner of Children's Services, the
Justices invalidated the "absolute" preference, distinguishing Mayor
of Lynn on the ground that while a statute could constitutionally
59. This alternative approach has recently resurfaced in the area of racial em-
ployment discrimination. With respect to "voluntary" affirmative action plans and re-
medial court orders, should an employer be required to hire those minority applicants
who meet basic minimum requirements, even though he would normally seek out the
"best-qualified" applicants? See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MicEr. L. REv. 59, 85-90
(1972). Compare Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235,
313 (1971).
60. 269 Mass. 410, 169 N.E. 502 (1929).
61. Id. at 414, 169 N.E. at 503.
62. Phillips v. Metropolitan Park Comm'n, 215 Mass. 502, 102 N.E. 717 (1913).
See also Commissioner v. Director of Civil Serv., 348 Mass. 184, 203 N.E.2d 95 (1964).
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require that veterans be preferentially certified, it could not prede-
termine the appointing authority's choice among those lawfully cer-
tified.63
While other state judiciaries have tended to rely heavily on the
early Massachusetts opinions, some courts have taken slightly different
approaches, and a few have proposed new entries to the catalogue of
purposes attributable to the legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has taken the strictest approach short of totally invalidating the
preference. Agreeing with the minority 1896 Massachusetts advisory
opinion,64 the Pennsylvania court views the preference as just one
addition to the civil service rules, the unitary purpose of which is to
select the best-qualified job applicants. As such, the preference is
valid only to the extent that it reflects superior job qualifications.
Accepting the reasonableness of the legislative determination that
military service is some sort of job qualification and that the sub-
stance of such qualification is not otherwise reflected in the veteran's
civil service examination score, the court has sustained a preference
for initial appointment where the applicant had already passed the
qualifying exam, 65 but has invalidated a ten-point promotional pref-
erence on the theory that it was necessarily excessive because the initial
hiring preference was also ten points, and the advantage of service
training diminishes as all employees learn their specific job duties. 6
The court also invalidated a provision waiving a maximum age limit
for veterans applying to the police force on the ground that if the
legislature believed youthful vigor to be an essential job qualification,
then it must necessarily be one for all applicants.07
63. Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 281 N.E,2d 53 (1972).
This narrow distinction turns on the prevalent rule that the three highest eligibles are
certified for any single opening and the hiring authority may choose any one of the
three. If another position comes open, the civil service commission adds the next-highest
eligible to the two already certified, again giving the hiring authority a choice among
the three highest-standing applicants. See also note 388 infra.
64. See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
65. Commonwealth ex re. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 571 n.3, 3 A.2d 701,
703 (1938).
66. Commonwealth ex reL Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 25 (1951).
Although the court's approach of accepting without demonstration the legislative deter-
nuination that service is a recognizable job qualification while quarreling with'the legis-
lature's point allocation seems highly questionable (as much because of its logical in-
consistency as its incursion into legislative territory under the guise of substantive due
process), the Pennsylvania cases are noteworthy for their preoccupation with the issue
of job-relatedness, an area that will.be treated extensively in Sections II, III and VI
B(l) infra. See text accompanying notes 77-184 & 313-17 inIra.
67. Carney v. Lowe, 336 Pa. 289, 9 A.2d 418 (1939).
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While most other courts have not followed the lead of the Penn-
sylvania court in refusing to attribute any but job-related purposes
to the legislature, the proposition that the preference is justified be-
cause military service is a job qualification has long been a prominent
one, despite the argument's patent implausibility. The prominence of
this rather unconvincing justification is probably due to judicial unease
with the more plausible "reward" rationale. The "reward" rationale
has two versions. The broader one 8 asserts simply that the legislature
is free to reward its veterans, to pay off a debt of gratitude, or to com-
pensate for past services in any way it chooses. This approach recog-
nizes no distinction between a mustering-out bonus paid out of the
state treasury and job preferences granted at the expense of other in-
dividual applicants. Since few would quarrel with the proposition
that the state need not show any special public purpose in order to
deplete its treasury to reward veterans, there can be no objection to
the preference. 69 A narrower version, that supported by the Massa-
chusetts court,70 justifies rewarding veterans not as an end in itself
but as a means of achieving another purpose, the general fostering of
patriotism. Taking this approach, courts have suggested that the knowl-
edge that the state gives employment preferences to honorably dis-
charged veterans may inspire current soldiers to bravery, or at least
obedience, and may encourage enlistment.71 The search for such a
public purpose would seem an implicit recognition that the prefer-
ence is different from a bonus and requires more justification than
the mere expression of popular feelings of gratitude.7 2
68. See, e.g., Bateman v. Marsh, 188 Misc. 189, 197, 64 N.Y.S.2d 678, 684 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd mem., 271 App. Div. 813, 66 N.Y.S.2d 411, (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd
mem., 296 N.Y. 849, 72 N.E.2d 30 (1947). Compare State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil
Serv. Comnm'n, 139 Conn. 102, 90 A.2d 862 (1952).
69. One possible response to this broad assertion is that the people are free to pay
off any real or imagined debt so long as it is the people who are really paying. When;
however, the people assuage their feelings by casting a heavy burden on a relatively
small group of citizens (non-veteran civil service job applicants), the equal protection
clause requires that the state offer more justification-specifically, that some sort of
independent "public purpose" underlie the distribution of the reward.
70. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
71. See, e.g., White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868, cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973 (1958)
(holding that a male non-veteran's challenge to the federal preference raised no
substantial constitutional issue); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D.
Pa. 1973); Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Serv., 361 Mass. 480, 281 N.E.2d 53
(1972); cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Query whether in view of Con-
gress's art. I, § 8 power "to raise and support armies," a distinction should be made
between the federal and the state governments' interests in encouraging enlistment and
certain types of in-service behavior. See the concurring opinion in Koelfgen v. Jackson,
355 F. Supp. at 255; cf. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. at 376.
72. See note 69 supra.
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The least utilized but seemingly most persuasive justification is
that the preference is a measure intended to ease the veteran's transi-
tion from military to civilian life, to aid those whose work and social
lives have been severely disrupted by military service. This rationale
appears to have been first suggested by the Supreme Court in 1948 in
the course of statutory interpretation of the Veterans' Preference Act
of 1944.73 There are several possible reasons why courts have not at-
tributed this purpose to the legislature. The preference is almost in-
variably a lifetime preference, a feature that tends to undermine the
readjustment rationale and augment the reward rationale. Also, many
of the preferences were enacted between wars, in periods during which
there were no returning veterans.74
In summary, an examination of the history of early constitutional
challenges to veterans' civil service preferences shows that male chal-
lengers made substantive due process and equal protection arguments
and that the courts, effectively applying a "rational basis" analysis,
sustained the preferences on the grounds that the legislature reason-
ably believed or reasonably could have believed that military service
is a job qualification, that veterans deserve a reward, that rewarding
veterans serves other permissible state objectives, and that veterans
are in need of readjustment assistance.
The rest of this article will consider this result from a different
point of view: Does a female plaintiff's assertion that the preference
has a differential impact on women's employment opportunities re-
quire that the reviewing court apply a different standard of review
and, consequently, reach a different result? In order to explore fully
all the issues raised by this question, it will be necessary first to ex-
plore (1) the operation of the preference in light of concepts developed
under fair employment practice laws; (2) the relationship of those
statutory concepts to fourteenth amendment analysis; (3) the mean-
ing of "intent to discriminate" in de facto 75 discrimination cases; and
(4) whether the dose relationship between the sexually dispropor-
tionate impact of the preferences and de jure,70 or explicitly sex-based,
73. See Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 418-20 (1948). See also Koelfgcn v.
Jackson, 355 F. Supp. at 251; Bateman v. Marsh, 188 Misc. at 196, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
74. Recall, for example, the Massachusetts court's observation that the class of
persons eligible for the preference, Civil War veterans, was a class that had been closed
for some time. See Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N.E. 1005 (1896), discussed in
text accompanying note 48 supra.




discrimination in the armed forces requires that the preferences them-
selves be treated as de jure discrimination. The preferences will then
be examined under available standards of equal protectiol review,
with special attention devoted to the formulation of an appropriate
constitutional and statutory standard for reviewing public job require-
ments that do not even purport to be job related, but are designed to
effectuate other social goals3 7 Finally, the article will survey recent
litigation challenging state preferences as sexually discriminatory.
II. THE PREFERENCE AND FAiR EMPLOYMENT LAWS
In this section we will first consider the preference in the lan-
guage and terminology of Title VII of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act,78 and then determine whether the preference is directly
invalidated by Title VII or whether that statute's saving clause op-
erates to preclude such a result.
The preference is a "test" within the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission [EEOC] Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures.79 A test is "any paper-and-pencil or performance measure
used as a basis for any employment decision. . . .The term 'test'
includes . . . specific qualifying or disqualifying personal history or
background requirements, [and] specific educational or work history
requirements ... "80
77. More specifically, the "compelling social necessity" test developed in Section VI
B(2) infra, text accompanying notes 317-36 infra, will be designed for those cases in
which both of the following circumstances are present: (1) facially neutral public
employment criteria operate to disproportionately exclude members of groups historically
subject to de jure employment discrimination, and (2) either Title VII is applicable,
or the challenge is constitutionally based and governmental intent to discriminate or
other factors make it appropriate to treat the de facto effect as de jure discrimination.
Excluded, because of the implications of Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976),
are purely de facto constitutional cases, in which "mere rationality" is the appropriate
standard of review. Washington v. Davis is discussed in text accompanying notes 155-84
infra.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended (1974).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 et seq. (1975). These guidelines are an amplified version of
those first announced by the Commission in 1966. For a history of the guidelines, see
Blumrosen, supra note 59, at 60 n.5. The guidelines were validated, at least in part, by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed in
text accompanying notes 94-107, 302-07 infra, and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975). But 4c. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2052-54 (1976).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1975). It might be suggested that insofar as a job re-
quirement does not even purport to be a "performance measure," the guidelines are
inapplicable. It is suggested, however, that the Commission did not intend to exclude
employment requirements unrelated to job performance. Rather, it merely did not con-
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The Guidelines regulate the use of "any test which adversely
affects hiring . . . of classes protected by Title VII."8' The pref-
erence adversely affects civil service hiring of women because the
characteristic of being a veteran appears frequently and almost ex-
clusively in the male population. Forty percent of working-age males
are veterans. Less than one percent of working-age females are vet-
erans . 2 These statistics constitute ample proof of adverse effect."8
A finding of differential impact, often somewhat misleadingly
denominated "discriminatory" impact, is not alone a violation of the
statute. Once differential impact has been shown, the employer must
justify his requirement or abandon it. The EEOC Guidelines provide:
§ 1607.3 Discrimination defined
The use of any test which adversely affects hiring [or] promo-
tion .. . of classes protected by title VII constitutes discrimination
unless: (a) the test has been validated and evidences a high degree
of utility. . .and (b) the person giving... the particular test can
demonstrate that alternative suitable... procedures are unavailable
for his use.84
§ 1607.4 Evidence of validity
(a) . . .where technically feasible, a test should be validated for
each minority group with which it is used; that is, any differential
rejection rates that may exist, based on a test, must be relevant to
performance on the jobs in question.
(c) Evidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated
with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.85
It seems clear that the preference could not meet EEOC valida-
tion guidelines. Assuming for the moment that Title VII's proscrip-
tion of discriminatory job requirements that are not demonstrably
job related cannot be circumvented by the employer's assertion that
template the possibility that an employer would defend a discriminatory requirement on
other than a job-related ground. There is nothing in the Act's general prohibition of
employment discrimination to suggest a distinction between performance and nonper-
formance criteria. See text accompanying notes 317-22 infra.
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975).
82. See note 15 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 302-07 infra.
84. 29 G.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1975).
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the challenged requirement is not even intended to be job related
but instead serves some other goal,86 veterans' preferences would seem
to fall squarely within one of the Act's central prohibitions. Title VII
contains, however, a saving clause:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal or
modify any Federal, State, territorial or local law creating special
rights or preferences for veterans.
87
While the clause does not save private employer preferences that
are not required or authorized by law, its language does seem to pre-
serve the civil service preferences with which we are concerned. There
* is, however, some basis for suggesting that the provision is not as
broad as it appears. When the clause was enacted in 1964, Title VII
did not cover federal, state or municipal employers.88 Logically, there-
fore, it is unlikely that the framers were even thinking about govern-
ment jobs. This does not imply that the section was, therefore, devoid
of meaning. There are several types of federal and state statutes that
regulate the employment relationship between private employers and
veterans. The most prominent is the Federal Veterans' Reemploy-
ment Rights Act, 9 which requires that veterans be allowed to return
to their preservice jobs. There are also a variety of state laws which
require that private state contractors give special consideration to
veterans.9 0
There appears to be virtually no legislative history relating to
the savings clause. The House Report merely repeats the clause but
omits the term "preferences," 91 arguably suggesting that the House
Judiciary Committee, at least, was thinking about reemployment
"rights" rather than employment "preferences."
Whatever the logic of the assertion that Congress was not initially
thinking about state employer relationships, the courts could justi-
fiably decline to narrow the provision, in view of subsequent legisla-
86. See text accompanying notes 317-35 infra.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 (1970).
88. Public employee coverage was added by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 83 Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
89. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1974). There are also similar state acts. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Mu.. LAW § 317 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
90. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 26 (West Supp. 1972); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 283:4-9 (1943).
91. "Section 713 provides that this title will not repeal or modify any Federal,
State, territorial or local law creating special rights for veterans." H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2407 (1964).
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tive developments. The 1972 amendments92 to the Civil Rights Act
extended coverage to federal, state and municipal employees. The
broad language of the 1964 savings clause appeared to cover all em-
ployment relationships in which a veterans' preference or right was
granted by law. Indeed, even assuming that the 1972 drafters under-
stood that the savings clause had originally been intended to serve
only a narrow purpose in the regulation of private employment rela-
tionships, it is difficult to envisage how they could have amended the
already encompassing language to indicate an intent to preserve pref-
erences in public employment as well. It is suggested, therefore, that
while a narrow construction of the savings clause would be logically
defensible, it would seem to run counter to probable congressional
understanding of the clause, if not at the point of initial enactment
in 1964, then at the time of the 1972 amendments, which extended
coverage to public employers. Thus, although the central thrust of
Title VII does seem to reach veterans' preferences in civil service
employment, the savings clause would appear to bar direct invocation
of that civil rights statute. 3
92. See note 88 supra.
93. Looking to the seemingly unequivocal language of the savings clause, in a
1973 decision the EEOC determined that Title VII is not applicable when a state em-
ployment service gives referral preference to veterans in accordance with federal regula-
tions establishing basic conditions for federal assistance to state employment agencies.
While the complaint in question was made by a male non-veteran, the EEOC ex-
pressed the opinion that it would reach the same result were the complainant female. The
EEOC did not look to the legislative history of the savings clause. EEOC Decision
74-64, 2 EMPL. PRAc. GumE (CCH) (8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) f 6419 (Dec. 7, 1973).
Prospective litigants should not, however, neglect the possibility that a state's pref-
erence provision may be vulnerable under a state civil rights statute. Absent any savings
clause, a human rights statute may properly be construed implicitly to repeal a previously
enacted veterans' preference statute.
With respect to whether a state fair employment practices law repeals a state
disability provision that exempts maternity-related disability from nonoccupational dis-
ability coverage, compare State Div. of Human Rights v. Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp.,
50 App. Div. 2d 1083, 377 N.Y.S.2d 315 (4th Dep't 1975) (implied repeal), with
American Airlines v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 50 App. Div. 2d 450, 378
N.Y.S.2d 697 (1st Dep't 1976), and Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 50 App. Div. 2d 381, 378 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1975) (no implied
repeal).
Upon consolidated appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that the state fair
employment practices law requires that employee pregnancy disability be treated in the
same manner as any other nonoccupational disability. The court avoided the problem of
implied repeal by treating the human rights statute as supplemental to, rather than in-
consistent with, the disability benefits statute. The court reasoned that the human rights
law simply extended the coverage conferred by the disability benefits statute. 41 N.Y.2d
84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976). This resolution would not be available
in a state human rights law challenge to a veterans' preference provision.
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III. THE SHORT-LIVED (1971-1976) CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
GRIGGS V. DUKE POWER: THE RISE AND FALL OF A SuI
GENERIS APPROACH TO IMPACT DISCRIMINATION
IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
A. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.94 dealt with the problem of job re-
quirements that, although facially neutral, tend to restrict the job
opportunities of groups protected by Title VII. Black applicants for
industrial jobs at Duke Power Company challenged the alternative
requirement of a high school diploma or a specified minimum score
on certain. standardized intelligence tests, on the ground that the
requirement was far more likely to disqualify blacks than whites.95
The Court sustained the challenge, interpreting Title VII not only to
ban intentional discrimination but also to regulate the use of "prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."96 The
Court thus approved the EEOC's position that once a job require-
ment is shown to have a differential impact on a protected group, the
employer must show that the requirement bears "a demonstrable
relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was
used.' 97 Duke Power did not meet its burden of justification with its
explanation that institution of the alternative requirement was based
merely upon "the Company's judgment that they generally would
improve the overall quality of the work force."98 The Company's
failure to offer any proof of content or predictive validity9 made it
unnecessary for the Court to consider what quality of proof would
have discharged the employer's burden. 100 Nor did the Court have
94. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
95. Regarding proof of discriminatory impact, see text accompanying notes 302-
09 infra.
96. 401 U.S. at 431.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974), reproduced in text accompanying note 85
supra. For a good discussion of "predictive" and "construct" validity, see Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337-38 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
100. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court, for
various reasons, found inadequate an effort retrospectively to validate tests originally
adopted without any validation study. The Court also suggested that even if the
tests were properly validated, plaintiff's demonstration that there were available other
suitable non-discriminatory tests would oblige the employer to abandon his use of a
validated but discriminatory test. Id. at 425. See note 314 infra.
1976-77]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to consider the extent to which an employer might have a statutory
duty to replace discriminatory but job-validated requirements with
nondiscriminatory requirements. The Court, however, suggested that
"[t]he touchstone is business necessity,"' 0'1 a standard that has been
rigorously10 2 applied by the lower federal courts to invalidate test 03
and experience 04 requirements, seniority systems, 05 an employer's
policy of disqualifying applicants with a record of frequent arrests,'
and an employer's practice of discharging employees whose wages
have been garnished. 07
B. The Use of the Griggs Standard in § 1983 Cases: The Sui
Generis Development
The Griggs Court did not purport to do anything more than in-
terpret a statute. For some time, however, Griggs was understood by
various courts of appeals to articulate a constitutional standard; and
that transmigration of theory appeared to have been tacitly ratified by
the Supreme Court.
Because public employees were not protected by Title VII until
1972,108 during the period between 1964 and 1972, suits sounding in
Title VII were brought as constitutional cases under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981
and 1983. Complainants alleged that public employers deprived them
of fourteenth amendment equal protection by utilizing employment
requirements that tended to have a discriminatory impact upon a
101. 401 U.S. at 431.
102. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971):
The applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for
adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an over-
riding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the
safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be
sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice
must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and
there must be available no acceptable alternative policies ....
444 F.2d at 798. See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418,
451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
103. See cases cited notes 109-11 infra.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
105. See, e.g. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 453 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
106. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
107. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
108. See note 88 supra.
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discrete group whose interests are specially protected by the equal
protection clause. Judicial response to such claims was generally
positive. The three leading cases in this area are Carter v. Gallagher,0 9
Castro v. Beecher,1" 0 and Chance v. Board of Examiners."" Until the
Supreme Court, in Washington v. Davis,12 explicitly rejected the
wholesale importation of Title VII into the fourteenth amendment,
it seemed to sanction this development. Castro and Chance are twice
cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."3
Where did the constitutionalized Griggs rule fit within the frame-
work of equal protection? Was it a specific application of the "rational
basis" test or the "strict scrutiny" test," 4 or was it a hybrid? In Chance,
complainants were black applicants for the positions of assistant prin-
cipal and principal in the New York City school system. The district
court 15 granted their request for a preliminary injunction against any
further certification from the current eligible list, after a showing
that the utilization of certain qualifying tests had a substantial though
not dramatic differential impact. The white pass rate was from 50
to 100 percent greater than that of blacks, but there was nd evidence
of intent to discriminate. The district court rejected the Board's
suggestion that traditional constitutional analysis required that com-
plainants show that there was no rational relationship between the
109. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
110. 459 F.2d 725 (Ist Cir. 1972).
111. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). See also cases cited note 144 infra.
Even before Griggs had been decided by the Supreme Court, some district courts
had applied the substance of that standard in § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Western Addition
Community Organization v. Alioto, 330 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Penn v.
Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp.
Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969). As noted above, the original EEOC
Guidelines were formulated in 1966, see note 79 supra, and appear to have played at
least some part in the pre-Griggs § 1983 cases. See, e.g., Penn v. Stumpf, supra.
112. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
113. 411 U.S. 792, 800, 802 n.14 (1973).
114. The "rational basis" or "relaxed" standard of review has, at least until re-
cently, been thought to require that the challenger show that there is no reasonable
relationship between the challenged provision and virtually any permissible legislative
purpose. The "strict scrutiny" test, on the other hand, requires that the state show
(1) a compelling interest in the purpose of the legislation, (2) a close fit between the
purpose and the challenged means, and (3) that no less onerous means is available.
This more stringent standard of review has generally been reserved for "suspect classi-
fications" and "fundamental interests." See generally Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1076-1123 (1969). With respect to recent revitali-
zation of the "relaxed" standard of review, see Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972);
text accompanying notes 355-78 infra; cases cited note 358 infra.
115. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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qualifying examinations and the job requirements. Citing Griggs, the
district judge held that the racially discriminatory impact alone ren-
dered the exams constitutionally suspect, shifting the burden to the
Board to show that the exams were necessary to obtain persons quali-
fied to perform the jobs. On appeal to the Second Circuit,110 the
Board repeated its argument that discriminatory impact resulting from
a racially neutral requirement established without intent to discrimi-
nate should not, for equal protection purposes, be deemed equiva-
lent to a "suspect classification." The court of appeals conceded that
the Board might be correct but found it unnecessary to reach the
issue. It sustained the injunction under the more lenient equal pro-
tection standard. Test validation, the court said, is merely an appli-
cation of the "rational basis" test. If the test is not validated, there
is no rational relationship between the means-the exam-and the
end-getting qualified personnel. A "strict scrutiny" analysis would
begin only at the point at which the tests were found to be job vali-
dated. Then a "strict scrutiny" analysis would require that the Board
show that no less discriminatory means were available.117
Despite the court's vigorous protestations, traditional rational
basis analysis does not seem capable of supporting such a result.18
Under the traditional test the burden would not shift to the Board' 10
to justify the exam professionally in terms of both general and racially
specific content and predictive validity120 Instead, as the Board ar-
gued, it would be left to complainants to show that the Board had
no rational basis for believing that performance on the examination
would tend to reflect job qualifications. 12'
The facts of Castro v. Beecher122 are similar to those of Chance.
Black and Spanish-surnamed applicants for positions on the Boston
police force brought a 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 suit challenging certain
116. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
117. Id. at 1176-77.
118. While approving the result, the First Circuit did not find the Chance analysis
persuasive. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d at 736 n.14.
119. Id.
120. See note 99 supra.
121. Compare, for example, application of the relaxed equal protection standard
in Brody v. McCoy, 259 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), in which there was no alle-
gation of differential impact upon a protected class. A three-judge court briefly dis-
missed the equal protection claim of New York court clerks that new promotion rules
bore very little relationship to job qualifications, observing that "[a]s everyone knows,
the fortuities of individual biographies may cause a standard like this to work regret-
table distinctions where there are no differences in the 'real' merit that a higher justice
than ours would single-mindedly weigh." Id. at 942.
122. 459 F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972).
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hiring practices. The court divided the practices into two categories,
those which had been shown by plaintiffs to have a racially differential
impact and those which had not. In the latter group were height and
swimming test requirements. The court summarily sustained them on
the ground that plaintiffs could not show that there is no rational
basis for believing that height 2 3 and ability to swim are related to
the police officer's successful discharge of his duties. In the former
group was the written examination. The pass rate was 65 percent for
white applicants, 25 percent for blacks, and 10 percent for those with
Spanish surnames. In view of plaintiffs' showing of the differential
impact of this job requirement, the First Circuit adopted a more strin-
gent standard of review:
As to classifications which have been shown to have a racially
discriminatory impact, more is required by way of justification. The
public employer must, we think, in order to justify the use of a means
of selection shown to have a racially disproportionate impact, dem-
onstrate that the means is in fact substantially related to job per-
formance. It may not, to state the matter another way, rely on any
reasonable version of the facts, but must come forward with convinc-
ing facts establishing a fit between the qualification and the job. In so
concluding, we rely in part on the Supreme Court's opinion in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co ..... 124
The court then found that the public employer's failure to provide
"validation studies relating the examinations to the policeman's job"' 25
was a fatal defect in the employer's effort to discharge its burden of
justification.
In terms of equal protection doctrine, it is possible to conceptu-
alize this constitutional absorption of Griggs in two different ways.
At first blush, the Castro court's means-focused approach suggests that
this is simply another instance of the federal judiciary's recent move-
ment toward a revitalized rational basis test. 26 Yet the persistence of
the old toothless test, side by side with the Griggs standard, tends to
belie this explanation. Since which test is applied depends on whether
123. Compare Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio
1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2646 (1976), in
which plaintiff challenged police officer height and weight requirements on the ground
that they disproportionately excluded women. The district court found for plaintiff on
both issues, but the court of appeals reversed on the height requirement. For discussion
of the Sixth Circuit's approach to such cases, see note 144 infra.
124. 459 F.2d at 732.
125. Id. at 736.
126. See note 114 supra.
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the job requirement tends disproportionately to disqualify members
of a class especially protected by the fourteenth amendment, it seems
plausible that we are dealing with some variant of the "suspect clas-
sification" approach. Under the rigorous "strict scrutiny" standard of
review generally triggered by the identification of a suspect classifi-
cation, the state must show a "compelling interest" in or a "com-
pelling necessity" for its goals, a close fit between the challenged means
and the goal, and the lack of suitable alternative means to effectuate
the goal.127 The second requirement alone, the close fit, is the sub-
stance of the "revitalized" or "strict" rationality test. 28 The second
aspect of the strict scrutiny test seems particularly prominent in the
public employment cases because courts necessarily assume compliance
with the first requirement, that of "compelling necessity." Obviously,
there exists an overriding public interest in hiring qualified public
servants. It is equivalent to the private employer's "business neces-
sity"' 2 9 of hiring employees who can perform the job.
The Castro court mused about whether it was applying the "strict
scrutiny" test invoked by the complainants and concluded that it was, to
the extent that plaintiffs' demonstration of racial impact required that
the state's goal be an important one and that there be "substantial
congruence of employment requirements to job performance." 30
While the police department's failure to show such congruence made
it unnecessary for the court to reach the third strict scrutiny require.
ment-that there be "no alternative means"-the court briefly con-
sidered the issue. It suggested that this last test should not be applied
in its "full rigor to a racial impact case,"' 131 but then went on to con-
clude that it would require a public employer to abandon a test that
was job validated but had a disproportionate racial impact if an ade-
quate nondiscriminatory test were available. What the court would not
do was "strike down an otherwise properly justified means of selection
in favor of a purely speculative alternative."u 2 This approach is, how-
ever, perfectly consistent with a "strict scrutiny" analysis. The "alter-
native means" test would not require such a result, nor indeed would
the EEOC Guidelines. 133
127. See id.; Developments, supra note 114, at 1087-1103.
128. See Gunther, supra note 114.
129. See notes 101-02 supra & text accompanying notes 100-07 supra.
130. 459 F.2d at 733.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974).
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Yet the strict scrutiny test is generally applied only when the clas-
sification is "suspect" or the abridged interest is "fundamental."1 34
Why did the courts impose this standard, or a close variant of it, when
the criterion, the job requirement, was facially neutral, there was no
allegation of intent to discriminate, and the interest in public em-
ployment was not considered "fundamental"? 135 The courts did not
answer this question in a satisfactory manner. They suggested that
it would be intolerable to hold public employers to a lesser standard
under the fourteenth amendment than that required of private em-
ployers under Title VII. 36 Yet it is not illogical or implausible for
Congress to exercise its commerce clause powerST to regulate private
employers more stringently than public employers. Congress has, for
example, created private employee rights in both the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act' 38 and the National Labor Relations Act, 3 9 and the courts
have not extended their substance to public employees through the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. 140 The difference is, of course, the
substantial, though not perfect,141 congruence between the classes pro-
134. See note 114 supra.
135. See note 357 infra.
136. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d at 733; Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 458
F.2d at 1176; Western Addition Community Org. v. Alioto, 330 F. Supp. 536, 539 n.4
(N.D. Cal. 1971); Baker v. Columbus Mun. Sep. School Dist. 329 F. Supp. 706, 721
(N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972); Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TExAs L. Rxv. 901,
920-21 (1972).
137. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Title VII defines "employer" as "a person en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. II 1972).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 141 etseq. (1970).
140. Indeed, recent legislative extension to state employers of the minimum wage
and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
(1970), as amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259,
§ 6, 88 Stat. 55, was declared violative of the tenth amendment in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). While the tenth amendment thus has been
construed to operate as a limitation on the commerce power, it would appear that
neither the tenth nor the eleventh amendment operates as a restraint on congressional
power to legislate under the fourteenth amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct.
2666 (1976).
141. While sex discrimination is prohibited by Title VII, classification by gender
has not yet been recognized as "suspect" by a majority of the Supreme Court justices.
See text accompanying note 297 infra. In contrast, although aliens are not a protected
class under Title VII, Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), alienage is a
"suspect classification" for equal protection purposes, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973). The net result is that private employers may arbitrarily discriminate
against aliens, but state and municipal employers may not prefer citizens to noncitizens
unless citizenship is necessary for proper job performance. With respect to federal em-
ployment discrimination against noncitizens, see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct.
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tected by Title VII and those protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Yet congruence alone seems hardly a sufficient reason.
It is suggested that the courts' behavior was one more reflection
of dissatisfaction with the limits of two-tier equal protection analysis.1
42
In an effort to extend some substantial protection to complainants'
interest in racially neutral hiring practices, the courts turned away
from equal protection's empty cupboard to the riches of an admin-
istrative agency's guidelines. This seemed a salubrious development
in view of the availability of a workable standard of review and the
conjunction of interests at stake. While there was no intentional dis-
crimination, the impact of the state's practices was discriminatory.
While the interest in public employment is not one of those char-
acterized as "fundamental," it certainly is substantial. Although courts
had declined in other contextst43 to apply a rigorous standard of review
to discriminatory impact cases, seven of the eight circuit courts of
appeals presented with the issue agreed that litigants showing that cer-
tain employment requirements tended to disadvantage their constitu-
tionally protected class could command a heightened standard of re-
view.'4 The Second Circuit summarized this case law development
thusly:
1895 (1976), in which a closely divided court (5-to-4) invalidated exclusionary Civil
Service Commission regulations on the narrow ground that restrictions on alien em-
ployment serve no legitimate goal of the Commission. Assuming arguendo that Con-
gress or the President might legitimately exclude aliens from public employment, the
majority could perceive no constitutionally adequate relationship between the Commis-
sion's rules and "[t]he only concern of the Civil Service Commission [which] is the pro-
motion of an efficient federal service." Id. at 1911.
142. See authorities cited note 114 supra.
143. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137 (1971) ; Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456 (1973).
144. Chicano Police Officers Ass'n v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431, 438-440 (10th Cir.
1975); Kirkland v. Dep't of Correctional Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2nd Cir. 1975); Douglas
v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956,
959 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976); Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v.
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019, 1021 (1st Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975);
Walston v. County School Bd. 492 F.2d 919, 924-27 (4th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Kloster,
486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975);
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1972); Armstead v. Starkville Mun.
Sep. School Dist., 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458
F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir.
1971), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). See also Baker v. Columbus Mun. Sep.
School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972); Western Addition Community
Org. v. Alioto, 350 F. Supp. 536, 539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F.
Supp. 1238, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
The Sixth Circuit initially equated the fourteenth amendment and Title VII in
Afro Am. Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 301 (6th Cir. 1974), but later ex-
[Vol. 26
VETERANS' PREFERENCE
The public employment test cases are sui generis in that the
classification is not made by the municipal body but results from a
testing device which in fact results in an invidious discrimination
since it disadvantages minority groups. Hence, while the right to
public employment is not fundamental in an Equal Protection con-
text . . . , there is a suspect (racial) classification which ensues.
There have been so many of these cases in litigation that a viable
test has emerged which . . . has wide judicial support. Where the
plaintiffs have established that the disparity between the hiring of
Whites and minorities is of sufficient magnitude, then there is a heavy
burden on the defendant to establish that the examination creating
the discrimination bears a demonstrable relationship to successful
performance of the jobs for which they were used.145
This development was, however, problematic. From the judicial
perspective, it represented an anomalous development not susceptible
to easy containment. In Jefferson v. Hackney, 46 the Supreme Court
had already declined to apply a heightened standard of review to a
state "percentage-of-need" welfare provision that had a disparate im-
pact on racial minorities. In the absence of any showing of state intent
to cause the disparate impact, the Court applied only the minimum
rationality test to a state scheme that paid a higher percentage of actual
need to assistance categories populated predominantly by whites (the
aged, blind and disabled) than to the category populated predomi-
nantly by blacks and chicanos (families with dependent children).'47
pressed doubts about this approach. See Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 493 n.3 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2646 (1976). See also Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d
1215 (6th Cir. 1975).
145. Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d at 1337,
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975). However, an examination of the cases cited in note
144 supra indicates that in each case plaintiff's prima facie case was established by a
showing that the challenged test or employment criterion disproportionately disqualified
blacks or other minorities. While such impact was generally reflected in hiring figures,
it was substantial disparity in the effect of the criterion, rather than in hiring, that was
essential to plaintiffs prima facie case.
146. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
147. Different welfare groups received different percentages of their members'
standard of need. The aged (OAA) received 100 percent; the blind (AB) 95 percent;
the disabled (APTD) 95 percent; and families with dependent children (AFDC) 75
percent. Id. at 537. AFDC recipients were preponderantly black and Mexican-American(85-87 percent). Yet minorities were also very heavily represented in the "preferred
groups" (37 to 55 percent). Id. at 548. This situation differs from the veterans' pref-
erence, where women are virtually unrepresented in the preferred group (1.9 percent
of all veterans are female). It is therefore possible to explain Jefferson in terms of
failure of proof; that is, strong minority representation in the preferred group precluded
any finding of discriminatory impact. This distinction, however, is weak both in view
of the Court's subsequent reliance on Jefferson v. Hackney in Washington v. Davis, see
text accompanying note 177 infra, and in terms of the proper definition of "discrimina-
tory impact." See text accompanying notes 301-09 infra.
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It is difficult to maintain a principled distinction between the social
and economic programs controlled by the Jefferson v. Hackney require-
ment of purposeful discrimination, and government employment, for
which, under a constitutionalized Griggs standard, a showing of dis-
criminatory impact alone would be sufficient to warrant a heightened
level of equal protection review.148 The distribution of public jobs
has many of the technical characteristics associated with programs of
welfare and economic regulation, as well as being a variety of social
and economic program. Relative qualification must be assessed and
lines, necessarily imperfect, must be drawn. Public jobs represent a
limited state resource whose distribution may achieve a variety of
social goals. This is particularly evident in the veterans' preference.
While this article will devote considerable attention to assessing
the permissibility149 of effectuating the social goals intended to be
served by this particular device, the larger point remains: state poli-
cies regarding the creation and distribution of public jobs have tra-
ditionally reflected a wide variety of social and economic goals other
than the obvious one of enlisting qualified persons to perform neces-
sary governmental functions. Jobs have been created to relieve unem-
ployment and quell civil disorder.150 Jobs have, in part, been created
to provide the currency with which elected officials pay their active
backers. 151 During the Depression, Congress, ostensibly to maximize
the number of households benefited by receipt of income from a fed-
eral job, enacted provisions that operated to exclude from government
employment the spouses of government workers. 52 During the same
148. See Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2051-52 (1976). This case is dis-
cussed in detail in Section III C infra. See text accompanying notes 155-84 inlra.
149. See Section VI B et seq. infra.
150. See, e.g., the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.(1970), as amended, (Supp. III 1973); Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2571 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. III 1973).
151. See generally Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2691-97 (1976) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
152.
In any reduction of personnel in any branch or service of the United
States Government or the District of Columbia, married persons (living with
husband or wife) employed in the class to be reduced, shall be dismissed before
any other persons employed in such class are dismissed, if such husband or
wife is also in the service of the United States or the District of Columbia.
In the appointment of persons to the classified civil service, preference shall be
given to persons other than married persons living with husband or wife, such
husband or wife being in the service of the United States or the District of
Columbia.
Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 213, 47 Stat. 406, repealed by Act of July 26, 1937,
ch. 522, 50 Stat. 533.
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period, the Massachusetts legislature considered enacting laws ex-
cluding married women from public employment, apparently on the
theory that there was likely to be another wage earner in the home.153
It is conceivable that, in the future, some job priority might be allo-
cated to welfare recipients, members of minority groups or the physi-
cally, emotionally, or intellectually handicapped. 54 Thus, an attempted
distinction between economic and social programs, on the one hand,
and legislative determinations regarding the distribution of public
jobs, on the other, seems weak both in terms of the technical or "line
drawing" nature of both sorts of legislation and the similarity and
even, at times, identity of social goals sought to be advanced by each.
C. Washington v. Davis
In Washington v. Davis,155 black applicants for the job of police
officer in the District of Columbia challenged the utilization of Test
21, "an examination that is used generally throughout the federal
service .. .and is designed to test verbal ability, vocabulary, reading
and comprehension,"' 156 on the ground that it denied black applicants
equal protection of the laws' 57 because a higher percentage of blacks
(57 percent) failed the test than whites (13 percent) s58 The plain-
tiffs relied on the Constitution; procedural problems foreclosed in-
vocation of Title VII.15 9 Although apparently assuming that, in any
153. House Bills 292, 707, 893, 1408 and 1705. In Opinion of the Justices, 303
Mass. 631, 22 N.E.2d 49 (1939), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
the provisions unconstitutional because they denied married women equality of treatment
with unmarried women, in that marital status does not bear any substantial relation to
need. 303 Mass. at 649-51, 22 N.E.2d at 61. A sixth bill, House Bill No. 556, would
have prohibited the simultaneous public employment of both husband and wife. The
court also found this bill unconstitutional as an unwarranted discrimination against cer-
tain married persons because marriage, or the lack thereof, to a public employee bears
insufficient relationship to the underlying issue, the applicant's economic need for public
employment. 303 Mass. at 654-55, 22 N.E.2d at 63.
Similar proposals were adopted elsewhere. For a discussion of economic emergency
measures enacted during the Weimar Republic, see Koonz, Conflicting Allegiances:
Political Ideology and Women Legislators in Weimar Germany, 1 SIGNs 663, 679-80
(1976).
154. See, e.g., German legislation discussed in note 41 supra.
155. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
156. 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972).
157. Since plaintiffs were challenging federal rather than state action, they could
not invoke the fourteenth amendment. The due process clause of the fifth amendment
does, however, contain "an equal protection component prohibiting the United States
from invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups." Washington v. Davis,
96 S. Ct. at 2047.
158. 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
159. 96 S. Ct. at 2047 n.10.
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event, Title VII standards were controlling, the district court never-
theless granted summary judgment to the defendants for two reasons.
First, even though the test had not been demonstrated to be a reliable
measure of subsequent job performance, 60 it was "reasonably and
directly related to the requirements of the police recruit training pro-
gram,"' 16' as measured by the trainees' performance on a test given at
the end of the training program. 62 In other words, as the court of
appeals later noted, one written test served to validate another: "the
validity study revealed that persons with high Test 21 scores are more
likely to achieve a final average exceeding 85 in recruit school."'61 The
second factor was defendants' good faith. Plaintiffs did not allege that
defendants acted with purpose or intent to disqualify black appli-
cants, 6 4 and the evidence negatived any such inference.6 5 A program
of active recruitment and special assistance, in effect since 1969, had
increased the proportion of new black recruits to 44 percent, ap-
proximately the percentage of area blacks in the eligible age group'0 0
The court of appeals reversed, explicitly holding that Title VII
guidelines were applicable in a constitutionally based public employ-
ment case.' 67 -With respect to the government employer's other re-
cruitment activities, the court, citing Griggs, stated that "such efforts
are irrelevant to the issue-the discriminatory effect of Test 21 it-
self." 68 The government's effort to validate Test 21 was inadequate
for a variety of reasons. Even though the government had not offered
any evidence to discount the strong possibility that all the government
had shown was that "a written aptitude test will accurately predict
performance on a second round of written examinations,"'100 the court
was willing to assume that the test was predictive of progress at recruit
school. High grades at recruit school, however, were not shown to be
correlated with job performance. The government's study suggested
that the contrary was true. Indeed, the significance of a high grade
at recruit school was belied by the Police Department's failure to rely
160. 348 F. Supp. at 16.
161. Id. at 17.
162. The district court opinion is not clear with respect to the measure of per-
formance. The court of appeals opinion, however, describes all of the defendants'
evidence.
163. 512 F.2d at 963 (footnote omitted).
164. 348 F. Supp. at 16.
165. Id. at 17.
166. 348 F. Supp. at 16.
167. 512 F.2d at 957-58 n.2.
168. Id. at 960.
169. Id. at 962.
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upon it for any purpose other than to validate Test 21. Nor had any
effort been made to assess the likely recruit school or job performance
of those who had failed Test 21 .170
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstate4i
the judgment of the district court. 1'71 Throughout the entire course
of the litigation, all parties had apparently assumed that Griggs'72
was controlling. The federal defendants had merely argued that the
Griggs standard has been improperly applied in this case because
Test 21 had beeff adequately validated. 73 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, sua sponte, questioned whether Title VII standards were ap-
plicable in a constitutional challenge to a government practice that
adversely affects the public employment opportunities of a group
historically subjected to purposeful job discrimination.1'7 4 Justice
White, writing for seven members of the Court, answered in the nega-
tive, citing, inter alia, Wright v. Rockefeller, 75 Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 11'7 and Jefferson v. Hackney.'-, Racial impact will not
command a heightened standard of review unless there is evidence
capable of supporting an inference that the racially differential re-
sult was intended. In this case the evidence negatived any such infei-
ence. The applicable standard of review, that of "mere rationality,"
was easily met. Test 21 evaluated oral and written communicative
ability. Police officers clearly need some of each. 178
Washington v. Davis is susceptible to very narrow interpretation;
and the Court left open that possibility by also relying on the gov-
ernment's showing of affirmative efforts to recruit black officers and
the government's proof that Test 21 was related to test success at
training school. 70 This second two-pronged basis for decision would
limit its reach to those relatively rare instances in which the govern-
ment employer had validated the challenged employment criterion
and had both tried and succeeded in producing an arguably fair
170. Id. at 961-65.
171. 96 S. Ct. at 2044, 2056.
172. See text accompanying notes 94-101 supra.
173. 96 S. Ct. at 2047 n.8.
174. Id. at 2046-47.
175. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). In Wright, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
a New York congressional apportionment statute that produced racially homogeneous
districts, because the challengers did not prove that the legislature intended the statute
to have a racially segregative effect.
176. 413 U.S. 189 (1973), discussed in text accompanying notes 222-27 infra.
177. 406 U.S. 535 (1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 146-47 supra.
178. 96 S. Ct. at 2050.
179. Id. at 2051.
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result in terms of minority representation in the incoming work
force. The broad language of the opinion, however, suggests that
the Court intended to cut off the effect-focused sui generis devel-
opment in the area of public employment, as well as parallel devel-
opments in the areas of public housing, zoning, and urban renewal.180
The Court's repudiation of the sui generis approach to constitution-
ally based challenges to government employment practices does not
have broad ramifications in that particular area, because Title VII
coverage has been extended to federal, state, and municipal govern-
ment employees by the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972.181 For most
fair employment litigants challenging facially neutral employment
criteria, Washington v. Davis simply means that greater efforts will
have to be made to comply with Title VII procedural requirements. 8 2
The decision is, however, important with regard to state veterans'
preferences, which are specifically excluded from the reach of Title
VII.183
With respect to the standard of constitutional review appropriate
in a challenge to veterans' employment preferences, Washington v.
Davis makes clear that if the sexually differential result is perceived
as presenting merely an instance of discriminatory impact rather than
ultimately involving a sex-based classification, a heightened level of
equal protection review would be inappropriate unless there were
some element of intent to cause the sexually discriminatory result.
Alternatively, to avoid the necessity of showing purposeful state ac-
tivity, the sexually differential result must be demonstrated to be effec-
tively a product of a sex-based classification rather than simply the
result of a facially neutral law.'8 4
180. The Court lists a series of lower court cases implicitly overruled by its de-
cision in Washington v. Davis. Id. at 2050 & n.12.
181. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17
(Supp. IV 1974)).
182. There may, however, be differences in the measure of damages. See Note,
Damages for Federal Employment Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qualified Execu-
tive Immunity, 85 YALE L.J. 518, 519-22 (1976).
183. See text accompanying notes 85-93 supra. Washington v. Davis is also, of
course, highly significant in the areas of public housing, zoning and urban renewal.
See 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12.
184. Stated otherwise, Washington v. Davis is totally inapplicable if the exclu-
sionary criterion-here, veterans status-is successfully characterized as a sex-based
rather than a facially neutral criterion. (This possibility is discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 246-77 infra.) Once a classification is found to be explicitly sex- (or race-)
based, legislative intent to produce a sexually (or racially) differential effect is, quite
properly, presumed. The constitutional inquiry proceeds along different lines. See text
accompanying notes 277-99 infra.
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The first part of the next section will explore the meaning of
"intent to discriminate" and the extent to which such intent may
* properly be attributed to a legislature which enacted a veterans' em-
ployment preference. The second part will consider the alternative
approach: that such an intent-focused inquiry is unncessary because
the preference's direct connection with de jure discrimination in the
armed forces makes it appropriate to treat the preference itself as a
de jure, or explicitly sex-based, classification.
IV. ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF
EQUAL PROTECrION REVIEW
A. Intent to Discriminate
While the facts of Washington v. Davis did not require that the
court identify the basic requisites of a showing of intent, the subject
is addressed in Justice White's opinion and taken up in Justice
Stevens' concurrence. Justice White repeatedly states that the ultimate
issue is whether defendants consciously and purposefully intended to
disqualify black applicants.8 5 While he acknowledges that in some
contexts the total absence of blacks may warrant an inference of pur-
poseful discrimination or, at least, a shifting of the burden of proof
to the state to explain such absence in racially neutral terms, his in-
quiry would still seem to focus upon the subjective state of mind of
the legislators or public officials.' 86 Justice Stevens takes care to leave
open several other possibilities:
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be ob-
jective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences
of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of governmental
action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective
decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. It is unrealistic, on the one
hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the
185. While Justice White cites Keyes to the effect that "the differentiating factor
between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or intent to
segregate," he repeatedly speaks only of racially discriminatory purpose. See 96 S. Ct. at
2048-49. While use of the disjunctive in Keyes can be understood to suggest that
something less than purpose might suffice to constitute intent (see criminal law dis-
tinction between "purposely" and "knowingly," infra note 189), this possibility does not
find expression in Justice White's opinion.
186. 96 S. Ct. at 2048-49.
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actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker or, conversely, to invali-
date otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive
affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional process.187
Stevens seems to be suggesting that the requisite "intent" should
be understood to encompass not only a desire to cause a certain result
but also the legislature's knowledge (or, more accurately, presumed
knowledge) that such result is substantially certain to ensue: "[F]or
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural conse-
quences of his deeds.' 18 This tort law definition of intent'" would, of
course, be useful in a challenge to the veterans' preference. Unlike
Jefferson v. Hackney, 19 ° where the defendants did not even know the
racial makeup of the various categorical assistance classes when they
set up their percentage-of-need scheme, and Washington v. Davis,'9 '
where the racially differential impact of the test was incapable of ap-
prehension when the test was created, it is common knowledge that
veterans compose a class that is almost entirely male. The early pref-
erence statutes clearly reflected the knowledge that the class was then
composed solely of males.192 Unlike the factual situations presented
in Jefferson v. Hackney9 3 and James v. Valtierra,9 4 the occurrence
of some significant sexual impact is not a variable of time, place or
circumstances. 95
187. Id. at 2054.
188. Id.
189. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND)
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 8A. Similarly, criminal liability for consequences substan-
tially certain to ensue from an actor's behavior is indicated by use of the word "know-
ingly." Compare "purposely," which indicates that the actor is liable only when he
consciously desires to cause those consequences. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Prop.
Off. Draft 1962).
190. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
191. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
192. See, e.g., the Massachusetts provision, discussed in note 55 supra & text ac-
companying notes 54-55 supra.
193. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
194. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
195. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), the Court sustained a California
constitutional provision requiring that all low-rent housing projects be approved by
community election:
[O]f course a lawmaking procedure that "disadvantages" a particular group
does not always deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably
a State would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless refer-
endums were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some
group.
Id. at 142. Likewise, in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), the Court noted
that there was nothing intrinsically discriminatory in the grant system.
[G]iven the heterogeneity of the Nation's population, it would only be an
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Utilization of a test of presumed knowledge seems far more prob-
lematic in an equal protection context than in tort law. In tort law,
for both normative and evidentiary reasons, intent is inferred from
the actor's knowledge of the consequences. Persons ought to apprise
themselves of the consequences of their behavior and, more impor-
tantly, it is socially desirable that they refrain from action when harm-
ful consequences to others reasonably may be anticipated. As a factual
matter, intent to cause a result generally can be inferred from knowl-
edge of the consequences.
Normative and evidentiary considerations do not, however, point
in the same direction when the subject is legislative intent. The initial
creation and ultimate passage of social legislation often involve de-
ferring the needs of some in order to secure satisfaction of the needs
of others.106 A program that benefits some may operate directly to the
detriment of others.19 7 Legislative experimentation and risk-taking
are generally felt, however, to be necessary conditions for social prog-
ress. To the extent that it is this consideration that underlies the Su-
preme Court's insistence upon "intent" to cause the disparate im-
pact,0 8 there seems no persuasive reason for broadening the definition
of "intent" to include "presumed knowledge of the likely conse-
quences" as well as "desire to cause those consequences," because a
standard of presumed knowledge would restrict legislative activity
almost as much as the rejected standard of "disparate impact." If, on
infrequent coincidence that the racial composition of each grant class was
identical to that of the others. The acceptance of appellant's constitutional
theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant
cIasses ....
406 U.S. at 548.
196. Congressional enactments may implicitly or even explicitly express this process.
Consider, for example, the Child Development Programs provisions of the Economic
Opportunity Amendments of 1971, S. 2007, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (ultimately vetoed
by President Nixon, S. Doc. No. 48, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., December 10, 1971). While
Congress found that "comprehensive child development programs . . . should be avail-
able as a matter of right to all children," § 501(a) (2), it found the needs of some
children (the poor) and some single parents or mothers (students or those gainfully
employed outside the home) more pressing than the needs of other children and parents.
See § 501 (a) (3) & (4). Accordingly, it provided that such groups would have first
access to such federally funded programs. See § 515 (a).
197. Consider, for example, an increase in the minimum wage. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (Supp. 1975). While improving the wages of some employees, an increase is gen-
erally understood to eliminate, to some extent, the jobs of other poorly paid employ-
ees-those whose jobs are simply "not worth" the new minimum wage. See generally
L. BURGESS, WAGE AND SALARY ADMINISTRATION IN A DYNAMIC ECONoMY 22-28
(1968).
198. See text accompanying notes 171-86 supra.
1976-77]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the other hand, one is willing to forego a certain measure of legislative
latitude in order to avoid certain socially undesirable consequences,
then it seems more appropriate to focus upon the actual impact of the
challenged legislation than upon whether the legislature foresaw or
should have foreseen the likely consequences of its action.100
Furthermore, the fact of legislative knowledge or probable knowl-
edge of a consequence often does not provide an adequate factual basis
from which to infer a desire to bring about that consequence. Often
a variety of conflicting inferences are more plausible. The legislature
may have carefully weighed all the consequences and decided that the
possible benefits were greater than the probable costs. The legislature
may have been aware of but indifferent to certain consequences. The
veterans' preference is illustrative. It is unlikely that most state vet-
erans' preferences represent a demonstrable manifestation of legis-
lative intent to exclude women from civil service positions.20 The
original legislators in Massachusetts, on the contrary, sought to avoid
this result when it could be avoided at little cost to the primary legis-
lative goal. Under the first Massachusetts provision, the preference
could not be exercised in jobs considered more suitable for women
than men.201 When rigid de jure occupational sex-segregation was
abandoned, it was legislative indifference to the sexually differential
operation of the preference, rather than intent to exclude women, that
was most likely responsible for failure to reconsider its desirability. In-
deed, in matters of sexual (as opposed to racial) differentiation, in-
difference has been the traditional hallmark of discriminatory legis-
lation, whether it involved explicitly sex-based classification or facially
neutral criteria that yielded sexually differential results. Furthermore,
199. One reason tort law looks to foreseeability rather than effect alone is that
it generally would be unfair to hold the actor economically responsible, for the unfore-
seeable consequences of his acts. Relief sought against legislative and administrative
acts is, however, generally prospective, i.e., injunctive. Potential problems of unfairness
arising from utilization of an impact standard are essentially problems of the appro-
priateness of certain remedies. judicially developed doctrines of sovereign, legislative
and executive immunity have been effective in avoiding arguably undersirable or un-
fair money awards against public officials and the public purse. See generally Imbler v.
Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976); P. BATOR, P. MIsHKiN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLERt,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1326-1423
(2d ed. 1973).
On the desirability of utilizing an impact standard, see note 245 infra and discus-
sion in text accompanying notes 199-204 infra.
200. Indeed, to the extent that de jure sex segregation was practiced-as it was
in Massachusetts, for example-enactment of the preference would make no additional
contribution to the achievement of this goal.
201. See note 55 supra & text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
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it would not even be fair to suggest that this indifference is based on
a callous lack of concern for the well-being of the female sex. Rather,
it is founded upon stereotypic views about woman's role, place and
condition. In the context of the veterans' preference, for example,
why ought the enacting legislatures have given much weight to its im-
pact on female job opportunities when the legislators believed that
women generally ought not and did not engage in any but familial
domestic employment and were suitably supported by fathers or hus-
bands? The persistence of these beliefs, despite increasing indications
to the contrary,202 is probably the primary reason203 for continued
legislative indifference to the sexually disparate impact of the prefer-
ence. While these observations may suggest the desirability of "im-
pact" rather than "intent" focused constitutional protection, partic-
ularly in the area of sex discrimination, they do not support the
assertion that, as a factual matter, intent to cause the sexually segre-
gative or differential consequence can properly be inferred from the
legislature's presumed knowledge of the likely consequences.
In addition to the normative and evidentiary problems posed by
attempting to utilize the tort law standard in equal protection analysis,
difficulties of application arise when "knowledge" is substituted for
"desire to cause the result." Since legislation, unlike a tortious act, can
always be repealed, should not subsequently acquired knowledge that
the legislation produces a racially or sexually differential impact cre-
ate a duty to repeal? If mere knowledge of the consequences rather
than a desire to cause those consequences were the operative factor,
knowledge acquired at any time ought to create liability thenceforth.
Proof of the racially or sexually discriminatory impact of certain leg-
islation presented in the course of litigation challenging such legisla-
tion ought to charge the legislature with the requisite "intent." This
is not, of course, the state of current case law.204
202. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.23
(1973); Bell, Age, Sex, Marriage and Jobs, THE POUBLIC INTEREST 76-84 (Winter
1973).
203. Anticipated resistance from veterans' groups has probably been another strong
factor discouraging legislative restriction or elimination of the preferences. See note 412
infra & text accompanying notes 411-12 infra.
204. In Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), while the fact that the de-
fendants did not know the racial make-up of the various welfare assistance categories
when they set up the percentage-of-need scheme formed part of the basis for the
Court's finding that there had been no intent to cause a racial discrimination, the de-
fendants' acquisition of knowledge during the course of the trial had no constitutional
significance. See also Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
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The relationship between the foreseeability of discriminatory ef-
fect and a finding of intent to cause that effect has been explored ex-
tensively, though not definitively, in the northern 205 school desegre-
gation cases. In material respects the resemblance between racially
and sexually discriminatory job impact and northern school segregation
is close. Each is the result of ostensibly neutral practices: specific job
qualifications in employment, and school districting and neighborhood
school policies in educational systems. Both are often related to some
more-or-less attenuated form of de jure discrimination. For the vet-
erans' preference, it is the historical exclusion of women from the
armed forces; for school segregation, it tends to be racial zoning and
the practices of public housing, urban renewal and FHA officials. 200
While the obvious effect of school segregation is a "dual system," a dual
system also results from facially neutral employment policies that have
disparate racial and sexual impact. With respect to sex, the situation
has been characterized as "occupational segregation" 207 and a "dual
labor market." 208
205. The southern school desegregation cases may be useful when dealing with a
state civil service that has a strong and recent history of explicit de jure sex segrega-
tion and still maintains a "dual system" in the sense that most job classifications are
sex segregated. See text accompanying notes 206-08 infra. Following the southern
school cases, such states would have an affirmative obligation to dismantle their segre-
gated systems, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
and a court order suspending the operation of even neutral rules, the preference, for
example, would be appropriate, see Wright v. City Council of City of Emporia, 407
U.S. 451 (1972).
A determination of the appropriateness of such an approach requires a careful
analysis of civil service rules and practices over the last three or four decades, as well
as an examination of the extent to which present distribution of state jobs by sex is
attributable to past de jure sex discrimination. Research in Massachusetts, for example,
revealed that de lure legislatively authorized sex-segregation, in the form of job requi-
sitions calling for one sex or the other and sex-segregated job lists, persisted until 1963,
and that almost all job categories are still presently occupied by one sex or the other
(the state conceded that virtually all of its female employees are clerical workers).
See Brief for Plaintiff at 207-28, Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass.
1976). Anthony is discussed generally in text accompanying notes 394-411 infra.
While it is not anticipated that many states will present either such a dramatic
picture of persistent and recent de jure sex-segregation or such clear-cut present day
occupational segregation, this possibility should not be overlooked.
206. This relationship with prior de jure discrimination is discussed in detail in
Section IV B in!ra. See text accompanying notes 245-77 infra.
207. Weisskoff, "Women's Place" in the Labor Market, 62 Ar. EcoN. Rv. 161,
164-66 (1972). See also SimmoNs, FREEDMAN, DUNKLE & BLAU, EXPLOITATION ROu
9 To 5 (Background Paper for the Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
on Women and Employment, 1975).
208. See Weisskoff, "supra note 207. Unlike employment discrimination, the creation
of dual systems of education does not absolutely deprive some blacks of all education.
The 'creation of a narrow, overcrowded labor market for women has, however, been
offered as an explanation of their relatively high unemployment rates. See id.
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Before turning to the relationship between foreseeability and seg-
regative intent, it is worth emphasizing a point implicit in the dis-
cussion so far and one made explicit in the desegregation cases. Segre-
gative intent does not involve any notion of malice toward or disdain
for black students. Thus, a school board may not prescribe intentionally
segregated "quality" education for both races even if it honestly be-
lieves that black children can be better educated in a segregated en-
vironment.20 9 Nor may the intentional assignment of black teachers to
black schools be justified on the basis that black students need same-
race role models.210
There are at least three ways in which the foreseeability of segre-
gative consequences has contributed to a finding that school board
officials intended to bring about the segregative result. Predictability
of consequences, in combination with other facts, may give rise to an
inference of intent to segregate.21' This approach would seem unex-
ceptionable to both the majority and the concurrence in Washing-
ton v. Davis.21 2 Alternatively, the foreseeability of segregative results
has been used to shift the burden of proof to the school board. The
board must show that segregative intent was not a factor in its'deci-
sion to perform foreseeably segregative acts.2 13 This approach seems
to have been approved by even the conservative plurality of four (per
Chief Justice Burger) in Milliken v. Bradley.214 A district court case
utilizing this method, Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac,2 5
was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 1, Denver, Colorado.210 Keyes itself involved such a shifting
of the burden of proof, albeit after a showing of intent to segregate
with respect to one part of the school system. 217 While, as a practical
matter, allocation of the burden of proof may be decisive, such a shift-
209. See United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535, 538 n.14(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975).
210. See id. at 538 n.14.
211. See, e.g., Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 352(9th Cir. 1974); Davis v. School Dist. of City of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573, 576 (6th Cir.
1971); Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 481, aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerri-
gan, 509 F.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
212. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra.
213. See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 538 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508
F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
214. 418 U.S. 717, 741 n.19 (1974).
215. 309 F. Supp. 734, 743-44 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
216. 413 U.S. 189, 210 (1973).
217. Id. at 208-10.
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ing of the burden is not inconsistent with a requirement that segre-
gative intent ultimately be found. Indeed, Washington v. Davis218
itself may be read as a case involving a shifting of the burden of proof
on the issue of segregative intent after plaintiff had made an initial
showing of discriminatory impact. The Court relied alternatively on
the government's proof, through its validation of Test 21 and its good
faith effective action to achieve fair minority representation, of its
lack of intent to effect racial discriminaton.219
The third and most radical approach to school segregation would
find that the intent requirement is satisfied by proof that the segre-
gative consequences were foreseeable. Under this analysis, the court
declines to make any inferences about the subjective state of mind of
governmental actors. Two such cases are the Second Circuit's Hart v.
Community School Board of Education, N.Y. School District No. 21220
and the Fifth Circuit's Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District.221 Hart is worth some serious consideration because, unlike
Cisneros, it was decided after Keyes. 222 Keyes dealt with a court's ca-
pacity to generalize to an entire city system purposeful discrimination
found with respect to one geographical area. Because its ultimate
holding involved the interrelationship of a variety of complex factors,
its discussion of the significance of a finding of intent to discriminate
can be viewed as dictum. The language is clear, however, and repre-
sents the view of all but two (Douglas and Powell) of the participat-
ing justices. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan said: "We em-
phasize that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation
and so-called de facto segregation .. . is purpose or intent to dis-
criminate. ' 223 In their separate opinions, Justices Douglas (concur-
ring)224 and Powell (concurring in part, dissenting in part) 225 felt
that they had joined issue with the majority on whether a distinction
ought to be made between purposeful (de jure) and impact (de facto)
discrimination. Justice Powell wrote:
I would not, however, perpetuate the de jure/de facto distinc-
218. 96 S. Ot. 2040 (1976).
219. See text accompanying notes 178-80 supra.
220. 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
221. 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922, reh. denied, 414
U.s. 881 (1973).
222. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
223. Id. at 208.
224. Id. at 214.
225. Id. at 217.
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tion nor would I leave to petitioner the initial tortuous effort of iden-
tifying "segregative acts" and deducing "segregative intent."226
The Court today . . . clings tenuously to its distinction. It
searches for de jure action in what the Denver School Board has done
or failed to do, and even here the Court does not rely upon the results
or effects of the Board's conduct but feels compelled to find segrega-
tive intent .... 227
In Hart,2 8 the NAACP complained of purposeful discrimination
in one New York City school. The trial court found for plaintiffs but
explicitly did not find any "intent or desire" to segregate. 2 9 The
Second Circuit affirmed, treating the absence of such finding as imma-
,terial in view of the trial court's finding that the segregative effect of
the school board's acts was foreseeable. 230 The court of appeals char-
acterized the Keyes language as dictum because it had not been neces-
sary in Keyes to distinguish between intentional acts of school author-
ities that produce reasonably foreseeable segregative results, on the
one hand, and acts segregative in motive, on the other.23 1 The Second
Circuit also reformulated the de facto/de jure distinction in terms of
conditions "created by factors apart from conscious activity of govern-
ment '23 2 (de facto) and conditions "caused or maintained by state
action" (de jure):233 "Unless the Supreme Court speaks to the con-
trary, we believe that a finding of de jure segregation may be based on
actions taken, coupled with omissions made, by governmental author-
ities which have the natural and foreseeable consequences of causing
educational segregation ....
The Second Circuit's position, tenuous when announced, seems
even less viable after Washington v. Davis.23 5 Both Justice Powell in
his concurrence in Keyes and the Second Circuit in Hart relied upon
the methodology of Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 6 which
disapproved the division of a segregated school system already under
an order to desegregate. In determining whether such action was con-
226. Id. at 224.
227. Id. at 230.
228. 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
229. Id. at 44.




234. Id. at 50.
235. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). See text accompanying notes 155-84 supra.
236. 407 U.S. 451 (1972). In Keyes, justice Powell discusses Wright at 413 U.S.
at 231-32. In Hart, the Second Circuit discusses Wright at 512 F.2d at 50.
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sistent with the outstanding order, the Supreme Court looked to racial
impact rather than discriminatory purpose. The significance of that
case was severely limited by Waihington v. Davis-37 which distinguished
Wright on the ground that reliance on impact alone is only appro-
priate when the issue is simply interference with a remedial order,
that is, when "[t]here [is] no need to find an independent constitutional
violation." 238
After Washington v. Davis the message is inescapable: in order
to characterize the differential effect of facially neutral state practices
as discrimination for equal protection purposes, there must be a
finding of governmental intent to cause the discriminatory effect.
While foreseeability of the consequences may be a factor from which
to draw an inference of discriminatory intent and may shift to the
state the burden of negativing such intent, foreseeability of effect does
not in itself seem sufficient to make out a case of de jure school segre-
gation.
In addition to corroborating the necessity of a judicial finding
of intent to cause the resultant discrimination, the school desegregation
cases offer two seemingly legitimate means of minimizing the plaintiff's
burden: foreseeability of result may be used as a basis for inferring
intent and as a burden shifting device. Neither approach will prove
uniformly fruitful, but they do suggest some possibilities worth ex-
ploring. In the case of the veterans' preference, foreseeability of result
will generally be the only basis for an inference of intent. There may,
however, be other indications of legislative intent to exclude women
from employment opportunities. The contemporaneous passage of a
so-called "protective law" patently a device for protecting "male" jobs
from female competition,23 9 or a law limiting female participation in
public employment might,240 together with the foreseeable result of
the operation of a preference justifies an inference that the preference
was designed not only to reward veterans but also to reserve desirable
job classifications for men and to exclude women. Illustrative of such
a provision "protective" of male jobs is the Michigan statute sustained
in Goesaert v. Cleary.241 The Supreme Court upheld the statutory
exclusion of women from the bartending profession, rejecting as im-
237. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
238. Id. at 2049.
239. See the discussion of Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), in text ac-
companying notes 241-43 infra.
240. See, e.g., the provisions discussed in note 153 supra.
241. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
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material an offer of proof that the legislative purpose had been to
secure the profession for men.242 Not only would the Michigan pro-
vision certainly fail today243 but, assuming that such legislative pur-
pose were established, the provision's contemporaneous passage with
a veterans' preference statute might be sufficient to justify an inference
that in addition to the obvious purpose of rewarding veterans, the leg-
islature also intended to secure jobs for men. Upon such a showing
of related de jure discrimination, successful invocation of the burden
shifting device would seem to compel an inference of intent to dis-
criminate, since the state would have the seemingly undischargeable
burden of negativing a purpose to preserve jobs for males.
Yet it is not clear whether a showing of the foreseeability of the
sexually discriminatory impact of the veterans' preference should oper-
ate, like a demonstration that a school board knew or should have
known that its acts would cause or maintain segregation, to shift to
the government the burden of negativing a presumption that this re-
sult was intended. Two factors would seem controlling: the degree of
likelihood that the presumption is correct, and the parties' access to
the evidence. With respect to the comparative likelihood that there
was discriminatory intent, the possibility seems stronger in school
segregation cases. It is important to remember, however, that it is
merely intent to cause the consequences, and not malice, with which
we are concerned. While malice toward the victim may enhance the
likelihood of intent to exclude or segregate, other feelings, for ex-
ample, stereotypic views about women's roles, may be effective sub-
stitutes for malice.244 Evidentiary considerations do not, however, argue
for such burden shifting. It seems appropriate to require a school board
to produce evidence that would negative the possibility of intent to
effect discrimination, because such evidence is composed of a mass of
details peculiarly within the school board's knowledge (for example,
why it drew a district line down one street rather than another, why
it assigned a teacher to a particular school). With respect to the vet-
242. Id. at 466-67.
243. The Michigan provision violates Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Title VII Guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1975). This section of the Guide-
lines has been approved in numerous court decisions. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465
F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972) ; district court cases cited id. at 1084 n.6.
More important, the provision seems incapable of surviving this decade's Supreme
Court sex discrimination cases discussed in text accompanying notes 277-99 infra. Cf.
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
244. See text accompanying notes 198-203 supra.
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erans' preference, on the other hand, to the extent that the legisla-
ture's intent on a matter of general interest is at all ascertainable, it is
generally as available to the plaintiff as to the defendant.
In summary, the school cases give some content to the meaning of
intent to discriminate and suggest two ways in which proof of foresee-
ability of result, while not satisfying the intent requirement, may con-
tribute to a finding of such intent. Additionally, it now seems clear
that despite the urging of some of its members,245 the Supreme Court
has declined to adopt the alternative "constitutionalized Griggs" ap-
proach: it does not believe that a heightened standard of equal pro-
tection review is appropriate for facially neutral policies that affect
substantial interests, such as public employment and integrated edu-
cation, and which have a highly disparate negative impact on discrete
groups historically the victims of widespread de jure discrimination.
Thus, standing alone, the sexually disparate operation of the veterans'
preference will not trigger a heightened standard of review unless
there is also adequate evidence from which an inference can be drawn
that the preference was intended to create or maintain "male only" job
categories as well as to reward veterans.
B. The Veterans' Preference as Sex-Based Rather than De Facto
or "Impact" Discrimination
The preference ought not to be viewed in vitro but should instead
be related back to the civil service applicant's capacity to acquire the
qualifying criterion-military service sufficient to warrant the prefer-
ence. The difference in numbers between male and female veterans is
directly attributable to federal government discrimination in the armed
forces.246 Women have always been ineligible for the draft.2 47 With
245. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 222-38 supra. As Justice Powell pointed
out, what difference can it make to a black child whether his segregated education re-
sults from a demonstrable governmental intent to cause a dual system? See Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217-33 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Similarly, what difference can it make to a female attorney forever
barred from state civil service in her profession as a lawyer whether her state's veterans'
preference was enacted by purehearted legislature A, wishing only to reward veterans,
or sexually chauvinistic legislature B, wishing, as well, to reserve certain job categories
for males? Not only is the unevenness of result disturbing, but the distinction between
intent to exclude, on the one hand, and callous indifference (the school cases) or
possibly goodhearted but ignorant indifference (veterans' preference), on the other,
seems both elusive and illusive.
246. See generally Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 489-90 (D. Mass.
1976); Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533
(1973).
247. While many would consider it a benefit (even a "blessing") to have never
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brief and narrow exceptions, women were not permitted to enlist
until 1948. From 1948 to 1967, 'women were limited by statute to a
maximum of two percent of the personnel of the armed forces.248 The
Army still maintains a two percent limitation by regulation.249 Women
are subject to more stringent enlistment qualifications than men. 50
Women's opportunities for training, advancement and retention al-
ways have been and still are very much restricted in the armed
forces.251 It should not be deemed significant that some parts of the
armed forces may be starting to abandon their discriminatory pol-
icies.&2 2 The effect of prior de jure discrimination on the operation
of the preference will persist until all those women denied equal armed
services opportunity have departed from the labor force.253 Nor should
the class of female civil service applicants entitled to invoke the armed
been subject to the draft, it is a benefit of questionable value when so many educa-
tional, job, health, and welfare benefits hinge upon service. Consider also the suggestion
that the exemption was "invidious" in that it represented the judgment that women are
not capable of armed service. Brown & Emerson, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 872, 967 (1971).
Exemption from the draft should not be analogized to the individually requested
special treatment accorded to certain persons, such as conscientious objectors. Cf.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). Women never asked to be exempted. It
cannot be denied that most women, if called, would have served.
248. See Note, supra note 246, at 1533; sources cited id, n.1.
249. See Note, supra note 246, at 1533. Until November 1967, there was a two
percent statutory bar. The two percent limit is still maintained by the Army. See 32
C.F.R. § 580.4(b) (1975). Women have never even achieved that percentage; they
presently compose 1.9 percent of total personnel. Note, supra note 246, at 1533. It
should not be concluded that this shows a lack of interest on the part of women.
As indicated in the text accompanying note 250 infra, entrance requirements are more
stringent for women than men, suggesting an "oversupply" of women. Corroboration is
found in Callahan v. Laird, Civil Action No. 71-500-M (D. Mass., Nov. 27, 1974),
a case in which the differential requirements have been challenged. An Air Force
colonel explained why the standards for women are higher: "We have had and we
continue to have roughly twice as many women apply[ing] as we are able to actually
take on board. We don't have an excess of men over what we can take." Transcript of
Deposition of Lt Colonel James W. Ward, U.S.A.F., taken December 12, 1972, by
counsel for plaintiffs in Callahan v. Laird, Civil Action No. 71-500-M (D. Mass., Nov.
27, 1974), at 37, 44, 45, reported in K. DAvmSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-
BASED DisCRISINATION 110 & n.27 (1974).
250. See Note, supra note 246 at 1539-43; K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY,
supra note 249.
251. See Note, supra note 246, at 1543-56. With respect to conditions in the Navy,
see Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
252. See generally Note, supra note 246, at 1533, 1557. The popular press re-
cently devoted much attention to the opening, in 1976, of a limited number of places
for women at the armed forces' academies. See, e.g., NEwswEEK, July 12, 1976, at
24-25.
The abandonment of discriminatory policies may, however, shed some light on the
question of whether such discrimination was ever necessary or justified. See note 275
infra and accompanying text.
253. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296 (1969).
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forces' history of de jure sex discrimination be limited to those women
who tried to enlist and who would have been successful in their en-
listment effort had they been men. The existence of the quota and
the knowledge that women's opportunities for service advancement and
retention are relatively poor have undoubtedly deterred female en-
listment. Women should not be required to have attempted to acquire
lengthy experience under a regime of de jure sex discrimination in
order to point out its relationship to challenged de facto discrimi-
nation.
There have been instances in which the Supreme Court deemed
it material that the differential impact of a facially neutral require-
ment arose from a prior de jure discrimination. For example, in
Louisiana v. United States,2 54 the Supreme Court invalidated a new
"objective" voting qualification test because it would have perpetu-
ated the effects of a prior discriminatory system in which whites, but
not blacks, had been allowed to register. It was not deemed significant
that the prior discrimination was not unlawful when it occurred. In
Gaston County v. United States,255 the Court, interpreting the broad
constitutional language of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,250 held that it
was appropriate for the trial court to invalidate an otherwise unex-
ceptionable state literacy requirement because the state had previ-
ously provided inferior education for black residents now of voting
age. 257 The same result has been reached in Title VII cases in which
facially neutral criteria tend to perpetuate pre-Act employment dis-
crimination.2 58 Although it is true that voting, unlike public employ-
ment, has been characterized, for fourteenth amendment purposes, as
a fundamental right,259 and Title VII, as Washington v. Davis210
254. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
255. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1975).
257. The Court was interpreting the phrase "that no such test or device has been
used . . . with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color." 395 U.S. at 287 (quoting from 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)). For a persuasive
argument that Gaston County expresses constitutional criteria, see Fiss, Gaston County
v. United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 S. CT. Rav. 379, 420-21.
258. See Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416
F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968), cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800
(1973).
259. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972).
260. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). See text accompanying notes 155-83 supra.
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indicates, is more than a restatement of the equal protection clause,
these cases would seem still to indicate that the existence of de jure
racial classifications that are causally related to the racially differential
impact of ostensibly neutral provisions will result in the invalidation
of those otherwise unexceptionable facially neutral provisions.
The issue of the significance of related de jure discrimination has
also been raised, albeit not definitely resolved, in the northern school
segregation cases. In Milliken v. Bradley,261 for example, the district
court looked at government action and inaction at all levels-federal,
state, and local-in housing as well as education. 262 In affirming the
trial court's findings, the Sixth Circuit explicitly declined to rely upon
evidence of de jure housing segregation,263 apparently because there
was adequate proof of intentionally segregative acts by school offi-
cials. 26 In affirming the challenged finding of intentional segregation
in the city of Detroit, the Supreme Court did mention, without com-
ment, the district court's reliance on the segregative acts of other
government officials in the city of Detroit.265 Justice Stewart, discuss-
ing in his concurrence the instances in which an interdistrict remedy
would be suitable, included intentionally discriminatory governmental
acts in public housing and zoning, as well as in education. 66
In United States v. School District of Omaha,267 the Eighth Cir-
cuit discussed the significance of de jure public and private housing
discrimination, endorsing the analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Brewer
v. School Board of Norfolk268 :
In light of the conclusive evidence of intentional segregative
practices by the school district, we have not addressed ourselves to the
appellant's contention that the public and private racial discrimina-
tion in housing provides an alternate ground for ordering all-out
school integration. However, we do subscribe to the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning:
S* "* If residential racial discrimination exists it is immate-
rial that it results from private action. The school board
261. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973),
aff'd in part, rez'd in part, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
262. 338 F. Supp. at 587.
263. 484 F.2d at 242.
264. Id. at 221, 227.
265. 418 U.S. at 724.
266. Id. at 755.
267. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975).
268. 397 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1968) (en banc).
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cannot build its exclusionary attendance areas upon private
racial discrimination.20 9
The Ninth Circuit was more cautious. It understood Keyes27°
specifically to reserve the issue of
whether it is sufficient to show intentional discriminatory action by
someone other than the school board resulting in racially divided
neighborhoods, to which the school board applies a "neutral" neigh-
borhood school policy... Engrafting a neighborhood school policy
onto such involuntary neighborhoods may be sufficient ratification of
the illicit intent of others to preclude the necessity for showing a
purpose by the school board itself to segregate.271
If evidence of public272 housing discrimination will arguably
transform otherwise de facto school desegregation into de jure dis-
crimination, evidence regarding the armed forces' exclusionary and
differential treatment of women should be of at least equal value in
showing that the veterans' preference is, in fact, de jure sex discrimi-
nation. Unlike evidence of public housing discrimination, which gen-
erally involves unwieldy proof of the written and unwritten policies
and acts of public housing and federal loan officials, evidence of fed-
eral exclusion of women from and, later, severe limitation of women
in the armed forces is clear, unequivocal and simple to adduce. The
only salient difference, it may be argued, between racial discrimination
in housing by public officials and federal sex classifications in the army
is that some or all of the latter have not and even might not be de-
dared unlawful. It is suggested, however, that one is as presump-
tively2 73 invalid as the other. In view of the Supreme Court's per-
269. 521 F.2d at 537 n.11 (quoting from Brewer, 397 F.2d at 41-42). The Eighth
Circuit's reliance on Brewer is, however, misplaced; Brewer, like Wright v. City of
Emporia, discussed in text accompanying notes 236-38 supra, involved the acceptability
of a school board desegregation plan required to remedy a prior judicial finding of in-
tentional school segregation.
270. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Keyes is discussed in text accompanying notes 222-28
supra.
271. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 351 n.1 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also Kelly v. Quinn, 456 F.2d 99, 106 n.7 (9th Cir. 1972).
272. In terms of the veterans' preference, it is unnecessary to consider the more
difficult issues involved in creating a constitutionally significant relationship between
private housing discrimination and facially neutral school board districting policies.
273. Even state racial discrimination in housing is only presumptively invalid.
There are circumstances in which racial classification in public housing might con-
ceivably survive constitutional scrutiny. Permissible state goals might include main-
tenance of racial balance and avoiding "white flight."
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sistent emphasis on the necessity of individualized rather than
sex-based determinations,274 it seems clear that were such massive sex-
based generalizations to occur in any other area of government em-
ployment, all or most of them would be deemed a denial of equal
protection. It is, however, conceivable that the vital defense mission
of the armed forces might be considered a factor that ought to limit
severely the role of judicial oversight, not because sex-based classifica-
tions are reasonably necessary to that mission,2 75 but because judicial
interference in the internal operation of the armed forces might gen-
erally impede its efficiency or morale. Whether a reviewing court
might ever reach this conclusion should not, however, bar consider-
ation of the reasonableness of such sex-based classifications in the con-
text of a challenge to the veterans' preference. A court's determina-
tion of this issue in a veterans' preference case will not interfere with
the internal operation of the armed forces. To the extent that the sex-
based classifications generally are not constitutionally supportable,
their influence should be narrowly confined to the institution whose
supposed needs are such as to insulate them from what would other-
wise be the applicable standard of review. A cordon sanitaire should
be drawn around the armed forces' utilization of sex-based classifica-
tions. Their influence should not be permitted to spill over into the
civil sector, as it does in the case of the veterans' preference.
The preference's relation back to an explicitly sex-based classi-
fication indicates that the preference itself should be treated as a sex-
based classification or, alternatively, that the relation back should
be treated simply as a factor that makes it appropriate for a review-
ing court to adopt something more than the minimal standard of
equal protection review. The first approach would allow the court to
apply the standard of review that has, since Reed- v. Reed,276 uni-
formly produced the result of invalidating explicitly sex-based legis-
lative classifications that negatively affect members of the female sex.2 77
Utilization of the second approach would allow for more variation in
the choice of a governing standard.
274. See text accompanying notes 278-96 infra.
275. Indeed, their "necessity" is belied by the recent but growing trend to abandon
them. See note 252 supra.
276. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
277. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). Compare these cases with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975), and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), upholding similar gender-based
distinctions that negatively affected men.
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V. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The suggestion that the appropriate standard of review may be
the one used in cases of explicitly sex-based classifications detrimental
to women requires some elaboration. The precise content of this
standard of review unfortunately has not been as succintly defined
as the "strict scrutiny" test applicable to classifications based explicitly
on race or alienage.278 The Supreme Court's opinions in the seven
significant sex discrimination cases decided during this decade 79 re-
veal a reasonably coherent judicial approach, albeit one not subject
to easy and brief encapsulation.
First, every challenge to an explicitly sex-based classification pat-
ently detrimental to women has been successful, whether or not there
was a demonstrably rational basis for such classification.280 Challenges
to sex-based classifications imposing a detriment on males have not
been successful, 281 indicating the emergence of a bifurcated standard
of review in sex cases.282
The bases for such judicial differentiation would seem to be the
historic position of women as subordinate or secondary and their ex-
clusion from major areas of occupational, social and political life.
Related to this historic perspective is the self-fulfilling quality of most
of the ostensibly rational generalizations upon which laws detrimental
to equal female participation are based. Thus, in Reed v. Reedy,28
the Idaho Supreme Court apparently sustained the state's statutory
preference for males as estate administrators on the ground that, gen-
erally, men are more likely than women to have acquired business
experience.284 The United States Supreme Court, declining even to
consider this proffered rationale, implicitly held it constitutionally
incapable of supporting a gender-based distinction.
This approach was quite proper in view of the circularity of the
state court's analysis. If the state is permitted to generalize on the basis
278. See text accompanying notes 126-27 supra.
279. See note 277 supra.
280. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiescnfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
281. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974).
282. See Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classification Based on Sex,
1975 Dunn L.. 163.
283. 404U.S. 71 (1971).
284. 93 Idaho 511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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of sex, women are locked into sex role stereotypes that relegate them
to a subordinate role in all areas of life. More particularly in this case, if
the statute prefers men to women, the statute is itself perpetuating
the generalization upon which it is based and upon which it relies
for its constitutional justification. Similarly, in Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld,2 5 the challenged statutory provision, which made working women
unable to acquire social security protection for their dependent
spouses, had the effect of making working women less economically
productive than working men, and hence fueled the generalization
upon which the social security provision was based: that women are
less likely than men to be the primary family breadwinner. The pro-
vision challenged in Stanton v. Stanton286 also displayed this circu-
larity. Utah law required parental support for male children until age
21, while terminating the support obligation for female children at
age 18. The asserted rationale was that males are more likely than
females to require extended training because males are more likely
than females to be gainfully employed outside the home and to as-
sume primary family support obligations. State maintenance of sex-
ually differentiated child support obligations, however, perpetuates the
very generalization upon which the differentiating provision is based.
Receiving less training than men makes women less fit than men for
gainful employment outside the home. The early termination of both
support and training makes it highly likely that a woman will look
to a better trained man for her support.287
The Court's intolerance of sex-based generalizations detrimental
to women seems to be predicated on two separable considerations. The
first involves accuracy. While the generalizations are broadly true, in
that they are more likely than not to predict individual or family
circumstances, the generalizations are not correct for a substantial
and rapidly growing percentage of women. 288 The second, concomitant
consideration, more profound but less explicitly articulated, seems to
be an (as yet novel) underlying assumption that law, unlike biology,
simply may not operate in such a way as to assign or support the as-
signment of narrow gender-related roles to women. When a sex-based
classification is challenged, the Court examines the underlying gender-
based assumptions, as well as the effect of the provision and such as-
285. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
286. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
287. Cf. id. at 15.
288. See note 202 supra.
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sumptions upon women's opportunities for sexually equal social, po-
litical and occupational experience.289
The gender-based assumptions that underlie legislative indiffer-
ence to the disparate sexual impact of the veterans' preference are
precisely those assumptions operative in Wiesenfeld ° and Stanton.20 1
Women do not engage in gainful employment outside the home. Their
economic needs are satisfied by male relatives. In the case of the early
Massachusetts preference legislation, which sought to preserve the em-
ploying authority's capacity to hire women,0 2 a different but related
assumption was operative. The occupational spheres of men and
women are separate and sex segregated. Men are entirely unsuited
and women eminently suited for certain jobs, ,such as typist, file clerk
and charperson.
The effect of the veterans' preference upon women's opportuni-
ties for sexually equal occupational experience is the perpetuation of
those underlying assumptions upon which both early legislative con-
cern about and later legislative indifference to the operation of the
preference were based. The preference operates indirectly to maintain
patterns of occupational sex-segregation at a time when both consti-
tution and statute would prohibit the direct achievement of such a
result. Since the preference operates only in those jobs that men con-
sider desirable, women's civil service opportunities are largely lim-
ited to those jobs traditionally deemed suitable for women, jobs that
are uniformly low paid and lacking in prestige. Limited employment
opportunities, in turn, discourage long-term work force participation
and encourage dependency upon male relatives. The underlying leg-
islative assumptions are self-fulfilling prophecies.
If the veterans' preference is effectively equivalent to an explicitly
sex-based classification because of the preference's relation back to de
jure discrimination in the armed forces, then the appropriate inquiry,
in view of case law development from Reed to Stanton,20 3 asks not
whether the discrimination is rationally based but rather what sort
of legislative goal is constitutionally capable of supporting a rationally
based gender discrimination detrimental to women. Since in each case
the Court has invalidated the challenged gender distinction, the most
289. This is done explicitly in Stanton v. Stanton. See 421 U.S. at 14-15.
290. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
291. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
292. See note 55 suPra & text accompanying notes 54-55 & 200-02 supra.
293. See cases cited note 277 supra.
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we can say at this point is that certain legislative goals are not capable
of supporting gender classificaions detrimental to women. Reed, Fron-
tiero" 4 and Wiesenfeld find inadequate the state's administrative-
convenience interest in using gender-based generalizations to avoid an
individualized inquiry into the underlying issue (business competence
in Reed, dependency upon the covered wage earner in Frontiero and
Wiesenfeld). Stanton and Taylor v. Louisiana25 are susceptible to
similar characterization. In Stanton, the state was avoiding individ-
ualized inquiry into the child's need for support by utilizing a com-
bination of age- and sex-based generalizations. In Taylor, which in-
volved the defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair jury, and not
the class right of women to jury participation, the state made female
jury service voluntary rather than obligatory in order to avoid deter-
mining whether each woman had child care and household duties
sufficient to warrant excusing her from this civic duty. The Supreme
Court has had no occasion to indicate what sort of rationale, if any,
would support an explicitly sex-based generalization detrimental to
women. 06
That the majority of the Court has declined to assimilate sex to
race and alienage in order to invoke the "strict scrutiny" standard
of review in the absence of any occasion compelling it to do so2
does not mean that the Court would not do so in a proper case. It is
therefore appropriate to begin a constitutional analysis of the veterans'
preference at this level of review and then to work downwards and
try on for fit a "strict rational basis" analysis,20 8 the least a constitu-
294. Frontiero v. Richard, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
295. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
296. Not all instances of gender classification are reducible to matters of adminis-
trative convenience. Would, for example, rationally based fears for women's safety
support a street and employment curfew for women in high crime (rape) areas, or
exclusion of women from jobs involving frequent opportunities for intimate contact
with male supervisors? Cf. Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973), in which
the court disapproved a South Carolina provision barring employment of females as
state senate pages. The asserted rationale was, however, avoidance of the appearance
of impropriety, rather than a rationally based expectation of sexual abuse. See id. at
231.
297. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justices Brennan, Douglas,
Marshall and White agreed that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must there-
fore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 682. Concurring in the plurality's in-
validation of a sex-based classification, Justices Stewart, Powell, Berger and Blackmun
found such "suspect classification" characterization unnecessary on the facts of the
case. Id. at 691-92.
298. See note 114 supra & text accompanying notes 356-58 infra.
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tional court should do in view of the causal relationship between de
jure armed forces discrimination and the discrimination effected by
the veterans' employment preferences.
VI. EXAMINATION OF THE VETERANS' PREFERENCE UNDER
A "STRICT SCRUTINY" ANALYSIS
Application of strict scrutiny analysis brings us back to the sub-
stance of Griggs v. Duke Power2 9 which, as we saw earlier,300 effec-
tively imposes this heightened standard of review under Title VII
in cases of de facto discrimination. It would seem, therefore, that a
Griggs analysis would be most helpful in a constitutionally based em-
ployment case in which the facts warrant strict scrutiny review.3 0'
The following analysis will employ the Griggs approach insofar as
it helps to give content to the strict scrutiny standard and will also
utilize it as a model for developing a conceptual basis for dealing with
those justifications for the preference that do not even purport to be
job related.
A. Proof of Sexual Impact and Definition of the Affected Class
Since the ultimate discrimination in the case of the veterans' pref-
erence is a de facto discrimination, it is necessary to show the sexually
disparate impact of the preference. While a showing that women have
been and still are totally excluded from entire job categories because
299. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
300. See text accompanying notes 94-133 supra.
301. Several varieties of public employment discrimination arguably would war-
rant fourteenth amendment strict scrutiny review: cases involving state utilization of
explicitly race- or sex-based classifications; situations in which the racially or sexually
disparate impact of facially neutral employment criteria is causally related to de jure
race or sex discrimination; and instances in which facially neutral employment re-
quirements rationally related to job performance (e.g., Test 21 in Washington v. Davis,
96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976)) are adopted or maintained for the purpose of excluding
blacks or women.
What approach would have been proper, for example, if plaintiffs in Washington v.
Davis had demonstrated that Test 21 had been chosen because of its known disparate
racial impact? It would seem that, even so, the test would survive challenge if it met
the "strict scrutiny" or EEOC Guideline test-that is, if it were compellingly neces.
sary to test for certain characteristics, if Test 21 did in fact test for those characteris-
tics, and if no other substitute test were available. A case involving such purposeful
choice of an otherwise unexceptionable test is Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate
School Dist., 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972). Query the standard of review applicable
to the Baker facts after Washington v. Davis.
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of the operation of the preference is strategically desirable for its dra-
matic effect,302 the Supreme Court in Griggs required much less as a
demonstration that a job criterion has a racially disproportionate
effect.
Proof of sexual impact need not involve elaborate statistical data.
Griggs makes it clear that it is not necessary to trace the effect of the
challenged requirement through the employer's actual hiring decisions.
Nor is it a defense for the employer to assert that regardless of the
effect that the preference necessarily has on those competitions in
which men and women vie for scarce positions, 30 3 women occupy,
nonetheless, their proportional share of all civil service jobs.304 Finally,
it is immaterial that some or many males are also disadvantaged by
the preference because they are not veterans.305 To show that a job
302. See the discussion of Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass.
1976), in text accompanying notes 394-411 infra.
303. The intensity and frequency of impact vary, of course, with the nature of
the preference, the extent to which job competitions are competitive, and the number
of competitions involving both men and women. The last factor is one that is likely to
increase steadily as de jure and de facto sex-segregated work classifications are success-
fully challenged. Jane Picker, plaintiff's attorney in Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3715 (U.S. June 15, 1976), noted that the most
intractable impediment to opening police and fire department jobs to women is the
veterans' preference. Ms. Picker reports that the Women's Law Fund, of which she is
an officer, feels that equal access to police and fire jobs would represent a very sig-
nificant gain to lower-income women, particularly black women. Where else, she
queries, can one earn $12,000 a year with only a high school equivalency diploma?
Speech to the Women's Law Association, Harvard Law School, March 21, 1974.
304. Contra, Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973), discussed in
text accompanying notes 383-94 infra. The court there suggested that evidence that
women occupy their "fair share" of all civil service positions is inconsistent with the as-
sertion that a particular job criterion is unlawfully discriminatory. Id. at 261. Cf. Smith
v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3715 (U.S. June 15,
1976), revog in part Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio
1973). Compare Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), which, while ultimately
finding lawful the challenged police officer examination, concedes the "discriminatory
impact" of a "test which excluded a disproportionately high number of Negro appli-
cants," despite evidence that the percentage of blacks ultimately hired reflects their
representation in the relevant work force. Id. at 2044-45. Thus, while Washington v.
Davis unsettled prior case law with respect to the legal significance of a showing that
an employment criterion operates with "racially disproportionate impact," it did not
alter the pre-existing understanding of the term. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), in which the Supreme Court was not impressed by the state's assertion that
the effect of the challenged provision was statistically insignificant, i.e., that women,
because of their longevity, were often appointed administrators. The Court narrowly
focused its attention on those instances in which the challenged statute did bar women,
"those situations where competing applications for letters of administration have been
filed by both male and female members of the same entitlement class . . . ." Id. at 75.
305. For example, in Griggs most white males were also unable to meet the diploma
requirement. See 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. In Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976),
some white applicants also failed the test.
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requirement has differential impact, Griggs requires only that com-
plainants be members of a protected class and that they show that
the attribute occurs substantially less frequently in their class than it
does in the rest of the population. Thus, in Griggs the Court deter-
mined that the high school diploma requirement was racially dis-
criminatory-that is, had a differential racial impact-from state census
statistics showing that while 34 percent of all white males had com-
pleted high school, only 12 percent of all black males had done so.a°0
The Court concluded that the standardized tests had a differential
impact from an EEOC study elsewhere, which found a 58 percent white
pass rate and a six percent black pass rate.307 It was no defense that other
(less attractive and less competitive) jobs in the employer's plant were
open to persons not possessing the required attributes or that a sub-
stantial number of whites were also disadvantaged by the requirements.
It should, therefore, be sufficient to show that approximately 40 percent
of all working-age males are veterans, while fewer than one percent of
females are veterans.3°s
The appropriate plaintiff is, of course, a female non-veteran who,
but for the preference, would have been certified. 3°9 In view of some
recent cases, it is worth mentioning that the female non-veteran need
not (and, indeed, should not) represent all persons and interests in-
jured by the veterans' preference. In Castro v. Beecher,810 the district
court refused to recognize as a class the black and Spanish-surnamed
plaintiffs on the ground that the written qualifying exam disadvan-
taged all those who were not "mainstream white" and that the class
would have to include all those similarly disadvantaged. The First
Circuit rejected this approach, noting that a more comprehensive so-
cial analysis does not "preclude recognition of a less comprehensive
claim. '3 1' Such a narrow approach is, indeed, necessary under a system
306. 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
307. Id. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 59, at 91-93.
The Court assumed, absent any suggestion to the contrary, that the incidence of the
characteristic in the population would be accurately reflected in the particular job ap-
plicants. This would appear to be equally true in the case of veterans' preferences.
308. See note 15 supra.
309. It is generally appropriate to speak of "certification" rather than "appoint.
ment" because the prevalent "rule of three" allows the appointing authority to choose
among the three highest ranking applicants. See Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252,
257 (M.D. Pa. 1973); notes 63 supra & 388 infra. It might be fruitful to explore the
racial and sexual impact of the "rule of three."
310. 334 F. Supp. 930, 948 (D. Mass. 1971).
311. 459 F.2d 725, 731 (1972).
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in which certain classes are specially protected by the fourteenth
amendment. If specially protected classes are subsumed in broader
groups composed of all those disadvantaged by a given requirement,
all will sink together with the "relaxed" rational basis test. This was
the result in Koelfgen v. Jackson.312 Plaintiffs purporting to represent
at least ten distinct classes challenged a Minnesota statute that granted
an absolute public employment preference to veterans. Among the
plaintiffs were good-government groups interested in effective civil ser-
vice, male non-veterans, male veterans ineligible to claim the prefer-
ence and, finally, female non-veterans. The three-judge court limited
and consolidated the various plaintiffs into one manageable class-
"[a]ll those non-veterans who have been denied employment solely
because of the operations of the Veterans' Preference Provisions ...
and all those . . . who have been denied promotion, solely because
of the operation of the [Minnesota] Veterans' Preference provisions"313
-and then proceeded to make short shrift of this omnibus class under
a flaccid "rational basis" standard. By subsuming female non-veterans
in the class of all non-veterans, the court avoided any consideration
of the sexual-impact issue. It is desirable, therefore, to pose squarely
the question of sexual impact by presenting a woman plaintiff deprived
by the operation of the preference of a job opportunity she would
otherwise have had, and by confining the class she represents to simi-
larly situated female non-veterans.
B. Applying the Griggs/"Strict Scrutiny" Standard of Review
to the Veterans' Preference
1. The veterans' preference as a job qualification. We have ob-
'served that the Griggs test is analogous to the "strict scrutiny" test. It
effectively assumes that finding qualified persons to perform jobs is a
"compelling interest" and then proceeds to require that the employer
show a close fit between the means, the challenged requirement, and
312. 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973). While
it is suggested that the issue of sex discrimination was not before the Supreme Court
in Koelfgen, the precedential value of a summary affirmance is, in any event, weak.
See generally Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). Compare Dillenburg v.
Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972), with Doe v. Hodgson, 500 F.2d 1206,
1207-08 (2d Cir. 1974), 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096
(1973), and Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 989 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
313. 355 F. Supp. at 248.
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the end, finding qualified persons to perform the particular job. Fi-
nally, if the employer does discharge his burden of showing that the
requirement is adequately job related, the plaintiff may still prevail
by demonstrating the availability of a suitable, racially neutral means
of achieving the same end.314
It seems clear that the veterans' preference could not be validated
under this standard. It is not formulated with reference to any par-
ticular civil service job. It has never been tested for content or pre-
dictive validity.3 15 The efforts of good-government groups to abolish
the preference 316 suggest that it probably tends to impede the forma-
tion of a qualified civil service.
2. What standard should be applied to discriminatory criteria
that do not even purport to be job related?317 Griggs dealt with hiring
requirements that purported to be job related. It did not consider
the extent to which a public or private employer can sustain a job
requirement that does not even purport to be job related but is
based instead on some substantial policy ground. Presumably, Duke
Power, a private employer, could not have justified its high school
diploma requirement on social policy grounds.31 8 But could a state
314. The third aspect of "strict scrutiny" analysis, the "no-alternative-means"
test, is reflected in EEOC Guideline § 1607.3, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974), repro-
duced in text accompanying note 85 supra. The Supreme Court has, in dictum, partly
approved this aspect of the Guidelines. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 425 (1975). Note, however, that EEOC Guideline § 1607.3 allocates to the em-
ployer the burden of establishing the absence of alternative means, while Albermarlc
assigns this burden to the plaintiff.
315. See note 99 supra.
316. The plaintiffs in Koelfgen v. Jackson included the Minneapolis Model City
Program Planning and Policy Committee and the League of Women Voters of Minne-
apolis. A Massachusetts legislative commission recommended changing from an abso-
lute preference to a limited five- and ten-point system. It was of the opinion that any-
thing more does "substantial damage to sound merit principles." Report of Special
Commission, House No. 5100, at 37 (June 1967).
317. This inquiry is directed to discriminatory public employment requirements in
situations covered by Title VII, as well as those, such as the veterans' preference, not
covered by Title VII but meriting a heightened standard of review.
318. See Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957 (D. Md. 1973).
Male employees utilized Title VII to challenge their employer's pension plan, which
provided earlier vesting rights for female employees. Defendants replied that the pro-
visions were adopted to redress the disadvantaged economic status of females in the
foundry and in the plant. Id. at 965. Though a proper factual basis for this argument
was lacking, the court rejected the theory as well: "Even if a desire to compensate
women for their inability to perform the higher paying heavy manual jobs in the
foundry were the reason for the discriminatory vesting provisions of the retirement plan,
there is no evidence that such discriminatory compensation was 'necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business.'" Id. at 966 (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) ).Query whether a private employer's policy of giving employment preference to
[Vol. 26
VETERANS' PREFERENCE
justify under Title VII the same requirement with respect to its civil
service employees, despite a differential impact on blacks, on the
ground that encouraging young people to stay in school would ease
unemployment and contribute to intelligent exercise of the franchise?
At first glance it would seem that a distinction might reasonably
be drawn between private and public employers: private employers
may be restricted to the justification of business necessity, while public
employers should be permitted to work out social policy goals through
the distribution of public jobs, even when such distribution has a
discriminatory impact upon constitutionally or statutorily protected
groups. Yet the 1972 congressional extension of coverage to state and
federal employers3 19 would seem to suggest, at least with respect to
Title VII, that one uniform rule should be formulated for all em-
ployers.
There are a variety of possible approaches. The strictest rule
would recognize only business necessity as a justification for discrimi-
natory job requirements. (Such a rule would not, of course, invalidate
remedial orders and affirmative action plans or "goals" designed to
remedy clearly identified past discrimination in that particular job or
industry.) This rule would seem consistent with the literal language
of Title VII,320 as well as with recent Supreme Court language
reiterating the Griggs "business necessity" requirement and reviving
the original commerce clause merit-oriented rationale for the statute's
enactment:
There are societal as well as personal interests on both sides of the
equation. The broad, overriding interest shared by employer, em-
ployee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship as-
sured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel
decisions. In the implementation of such decisions, it is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise.32'
veterans is violative of Title VII. It would seem so. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.§§ 1607.3, 1607.4 (1975), reproduced in text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
319. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86
Stat. 103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970)).
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1) (1974):
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire... any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
321. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
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Although this strict rule probably does express the meaning of Title
VII,322 a rule barring social policy justification may not be constitu-
tionally required in cases to which Title VII does not apply directly.
Title VII seems to have provided at least part of the impetus for
two divergent, but perhaps reconcilable, constitutional developments.
On the one hand, there has been growing judicial intolerance of
questionable public job requirements. Although the Supreme Court
has declined to accord procedural due process protection to the indi-
vidual's interest in his particular public job unless state law creates
some property right in that job,32 3 it. has recently, under a variety of
theories, invalidated discriminatory public job requirements not re-
quired by business necessity. In Sugarman v. Dougall,324 the Court
found New York's statutory exclusion of aliens from civil service jobs
violative of the equal protection clause. Applying a heightened stan-
dard of review, apparently 25 on the basis that alienage is a "suspect
classification," the Court rejected the state's alternative arguments
that citizenship is a civil service job qualification, and that a state
may properly reserve scarce jobs for United States citizens. 320 In Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFleur,327 the Court invalidated rules
requiring pregnant teachers to commence maternity leave four to
five months in advance of expected delivery dates. While the Court
reached its result by locating a "fundamental interest" in "freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life,"3 28 the net
result was invalidation of a sexually discriminatory, non-job-related
requirement-that school teachers be persons not more than five
months pregnant.3 29 Resolving a conflict between two circuits, the
Supreme Court recently adopted the Seventh Circuit's position that
322. See Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 365 F. Supp. 957 (D. Md. 1973),
discussed in note 318 supra; Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cin.
L. REv. 235, 299, 313 (1971).
323. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). But see
Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
324. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
325. Justice Blackmun refrained from uttering the words "suspect classification,"
but all the indicia are there. See also the companion case, In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973), in which Justice Powell was less coy. Id. at 721-22. See generally Justice Rehn-
cluist's dissent in Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 651.
326. 413 U.S. at 643-45. See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895
(1976), discussed in note 141 supra.
327. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
328. Id. at 639.
329. Compare the Supreme Court's due process rationale with the equal protec-
tion analyses of LaFleur below, 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1972), and Green v.
Waterford, 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
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the first amendment prohibits a newly elected public official from
discharging public job holders affiliated with the opposition party un-
less the positions in question are policy-making ones, for which party
affiliation and loyalty are job-related requirements.330
On the other hand, the lower courts have demonstrated a will-
ingness to find a constitutional basis for one sort of non-job-related
requirement-that of race-in "affirmative action" plans required by
state and federal agencies. 331 This trend is probably at least partially
attributable to the judiciary's exposure in Title VII litigation to the
seriousness and pervasiveness of employment discrimination. The Su-
preme Court has not yet dealt with the equal protection problems
raised by such "quota hiring" and "preferential admissions."2 32 If the
Court rejects the "strict rule" formulated above-that is, determines
that the equal protection clause does not require that "business neces-
sity" be the only permissible justification for a discriminatory public
job requirement-it might adopt a rule allowing for special treatment
of only those historically disadvantaged groups to whom the Court has
accorded special fourteenth amendment protection.333 Such a rule
would permit affirmative action plans for underrepresented minorities
or women, even when such plans were adopted without any reference
330. See Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976), aff'g 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.
1975). Compare Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972),
with Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020
(1972), in which the Second Circuit sustained a broom-sweeping exercise of the
victor's historical prerogative. See also American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Emp.
v., Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
331. See Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), sustaining the "Philadelphia Plan"
(20 percent "performance goals") as valid executive action "designed to remedy the
perceived evil that minority tradesmen have not been included in the labor pool .... "
Id. at 177. See also Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d
9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (sustaining state contract pro-
visions requiring public contractors to maintain a 20 percent minority work force);
Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
But cf. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal.
1972).
332. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), presented the issue, but the
case was ultimately declared moot.
333. The theory underlying such a rule would probably be that temporary ex-
pedients are necessary to right massive failures of distributive justice and that the
fourteenth amendment should not operate as a bar to efforts to achieve the kind of
justice the amendment was intended (and has grown) to secure. See Associated Gen.
Contractors of Mass. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
957 (1974); Morris, Equal Protection, Affirmative Action and Racial Preferences in
Law Admissions: DeFunis v. Odegaard, 49 WASH. L. Rav. 1, 26-31 & sources cited
at 1 n.2 (1973). See also Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. Cmi. L. REv. 723 (1974); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Pro-
tection, 60 VA. L. Rav. 955 (1974).
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to palpable past discrimination in the particular job or industry. It
would not allow the veterans' preference, however, because it does not
operate to effectuate the purposes of the fourteenth amendment and,
instead, tends economically to disadvantage an already disadvantaged
group 334
Finally, the most permissive rule not inconsistent with the "busi-
ness-necessity" doctrine of Griggs would allocate to the public em-
ployer who invokes a social policy rather than a business necessity
ground for his challenged discriminatory hiring criterion the burden
of showing a compelling social necessity for the criterion. It has been
suggested that Griggs is essentially a variant of the "strict scrutiny"
test, which does not require an initial showing of "compelling inter-
est" merely because the employer's interest in finding qualified per-
sonnel is properly assumed to be "compelling."335 When, however,
business necessity is not the basis for the hiring criterion, it is appro-
priate to ask whether the policy justification is compelling, that is, to
require that the employer assume the burden not only of showing a
close and substantial fit between the means and the goal but also of
initially showing that the goal is a compelling one.
3. Applying the "compelling social necessity" test.8A3 Some guid-
ance is available from those federal and state cases337 that sustain
various racial minority preference programs on the ground of com-
pelling social necessity. While none of these cases has adequately dealt
with the basic issue of identifying a compelling public interest in
achieving racially proportional job distribution, all the cases have
required, as a basic minimum, a showing that the preferred group is
one that is dramatically disadvantaged, in the sense that it does not
have its "fair share" of the jobs or opportunity for which group mem-
bers are now being preferred. 338
334. This approach finds support in the Court's sexually disparate treatment of
gender-discrimination cases. See particularly Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n.22 (1973). Compare Kahn v. Shevin,
supra, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390
F.2d 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968), with Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7 (1975), Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), Frontiero v. Richard-
son, supra, and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also text accompanying notes
277-93 supra.
335. See text accompanying notes 128 & 129 supra.
336. In the following discussion, the "compelling social necessity test" embraces
the second and third prongs of strict scrutiny analysis-"close nexus" and "no alterna-
tive means"-as well as the first aspect, "compelling state interest."
337. See cases cited note 331 supra.
338. In Altshuler, the court noted that minority members composed 40 percent of
the general population but only four percent of building trade union membership. 490
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Assuming that the legislative and judicial history of the chal-
lenged preference would allow"39 utilization of the civilian readjust-
ment rationale, it is this justification that seems most likely to qualify
in terms of "compelling social necessity." It is indisputable, of course,
that veterans must undergo a transition from military to civilian life.
But this is not all that the state must show to meet the compelling jus-
tification test. The state also must demonstrate that returning veterans
as a group are disadvantaged persons, that despite all their other (true)
benefits-including educational and vocational benefits and unemploy-
ment insurance34Q--they need special employment preferences to put
them on a par with similarly situated non-veterans. It appears that the
state would have difficulty in making such a demonstration.
In surveying the entire veteran population, Levitan and Cleary
found:
Veterans as a group are better educated and more affluent than
their nonveteran counterparts. Veterans have attained a median
educational level of 12.5 years schooling, compared with the 12.1
years attained by male nonveterans; this reflects the military's selec-
tion processes. The income differential is even greater. The veteran's
median income in 1970 was $8,660, surpassing the median income of
nonveteran adult males by $2,800.31
With respect to Vietnam veterans during the generally high unem-
ployment period of 1969-1972, Levitan and Cleary found that the un-
employment rate for Vietnam veterans did exceed that of 20- to 29-
year-old male non-veterans, in amounts ranging from one-half to two
F.2d at 18. In DeFunis, the Washington Supreme Court focused on the fact that
"minorities have been, and are, grossly underrepresented in the law schools-and con-
sequently, in the legal profession-of this state and this nation." DeFunis v. Odegaard,
82 Wash. 2d 11, 32, 507 P.2d 1169, 1182 (1973) (en banc).
339. See note 74 supra & accompanying text.
340. See text accompanying notes 25-40 supra.
341. S. LEViTAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 6. The most recent Annual Re-
port of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs (year ending June 30, 1975) shows a
similar gap in median educational achievement (12.6 years for veterans, 12.3 years for
non-veterans) but a greater difference in 1974 calendar year earnings ($11,360 median
income for veterans, $7,430 for non-veterans). ANNUAL REPORT at 13. The Report
suggests, however, that the difference in income can be explained partly by variances
in age distribution: if age is held constant, differences are reduced considerably. See
id. at 3.
Another reason for the favorable economic position of veterans may be that blacks
and other racial minority groups are underrepresented in the veteran population. While
10.7 percent of American males over 16 are non-Caucasian, only 7.7 percent of all
veterans are non-Caucasian. Only 8.8 percent of Vietnam era veterans are non-Cau-
casian. See S. LEvTAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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percent.M2 Such differences are not, however, dramatic in a period of
high unemployment. 343 Furthermore, it is impossible to determine
the extent to which the unemployment rate of returning veterans is
inflated by the ready availability of substantial unemployment bene-
fits?" 4 In any event, in 1974 and 1975, the latest years for which data
is available, unemployment rates of male non-veterans age 20 to 34
exceeded those of male veterans of the same age (that is, Vietnam era
veterans) .345
Finally, the earnings of Vietnam era veterans exceed those of their
non-veteran counterparts:
In 1970, young veterans (20-24 years old) employed full time earned
over $800 more than young nonveterans. The earnings differential
of older (25-29 year old) veterans and nonveterans who worked full
time was less than $100 annually. Veterans who did not work during
the year had incomes about six times greater than comparable non-
veterans. This was because the veterans' reported income was inflated
with military pay and veterans' benefits.3 46
It is, of course, difficult to estimate the contribution of the
veterans' preference to this favorable picture. The proper subject for
inquiry is not how many veterans used the preference to obtain a
position for which they would not otherwise have been selected but
rather how many of those preferred veterans would not otherwise
have obtained any satisfactory job. It would seem a difficult question
to answer and one that should compose part of the state's burden of
showing that veterans are or would be (absent the preference) a dis-
advantaged class.
It should be noted that in our effort to determine whether
342. Id. at 107.
343. During this period, the unemployment rate for veterans ranged from four to
nine percent; for comparably situated non-veterans, it ranged from 3.5 to 7.5 percent. Id.
344. See generally id. at 119-21.
345. For the year ending June 30, 1974, 5.1 percent of (Vietnam era) veterans
age 20 to 34 were unemployed. The figure for same-age non-veterans was 5.4 percent.
For the year ending June 30, 1975, 9.7 percent of veterans age 20 to 34 were unem-
ployed, as compared to ten percent for non-veterans of the same age. ANNUAL REPORT
at 4.
With respect to all male veterans for the year ending June 30, 1975, 4.7 percent
were unemployed, as compared to 8.3 percent of all male non-veterans.
346. S. LEvTAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 113. With respect to more recent
figures, the 1975 ANNUAL REPORT indicates that for veterans under 35 (nine out of
ten Vietnam era veterans are under 35), median educational level was 12.8 years and
median income was $9,550. For non-veterans, the figures were 12.9 and $7,350, re-
spectively. When age was held constant, the difference in earnings diminished to
$720-non-veterans earned eight percent less than same-age veterans.
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veterans347 can properly be understood to be a disadvantaged group,
one with a special problem that merits selecting them out for special
treatment, their situation has been contrasted with that of comparably
situated male non-veterans. A more devastating comparison between
veterans and similarly situated female non-veterans, the class chal-
lenging the preference, has not been made because the problem should
not be envisaged as a contest between classes to determine which is
the more disadvantaged (in which case female non-veterans would
certainly prevail) ,348 but as an inquiry to determine whether veterans
can under any circumstances be deemed to be an economically dis-
advantaged class. In view of their generally favorable position vis-4-vis
male non-veterans, the claim of veterans to disadvantaged class status
appears highly tenuous.
It would seem that the true basis for the veterans' "readjustment
kit ' 349 is not that veterans as a class have more severe problems than
any other group, but that they should not have to endure the difficul-
ties that others face. Generally, education is limited by personal re-
sources, but veterans deserve subsidized education. A high general
unemployment rate may be tolerable, but veterans deserve jobs.8 50 It
is suggested, therefore, that upon close examination the readjustment
rationale turns out to be nothing more than the old reward rationale.
And however laudable the desire to reward, it cannot satisfy the pro-
posed "compelling social necessity" test. Even the more sophisticated
version of the reward rationale, that which locates a public interest
in rewarding veterans, 51 could not survive a "strict scrutiny" test,
because the state's interest in encouraging enlistment, bravery and
obedience, wihile perhaps compelling,352 is only remotely served by the
347. All of the above comparisons have been between male veterans and male
non-veterans. No data have ever been collected on female veterans. The 1975 ANNUAL
REPORT explains that the female sample would have been too small to be reliable. The
Veterans Administration has, however, requested such information as part of the 1980
census. Id. at 3 n.1.
348. Regarding the earnings gap between men and women, as well as women's
comparatively unfavorable unemployment rates, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S
BUREAU BULLETIN No. 297, 1975 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS at 125-31, 64-72.
See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
349. See S. LEvrrAN & K. CLEARY, supra note 1, at 113.
350. Indeed, a substantial portion of veterans' assistance has been characterized
as a system of "preferential welfare." Id. at 171-74. This ultimate conclusion is not, of
course, possible in the case of the veterans' preference, because it is not a true benefit.
The only way to extend the preference to all is to abolish it.
351. See text accompanying notes 68-72 supra.
352. While the federal government could certainly claim such a "compelling"
interest in view of Congress' art. I, § 8 power to "raise and support armies," the
state's interest seems considerably more remote. See sources cited note 71 supra.
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preference and certainly could be effectuated more readily by such
alternative means as more pay or bonuses.
In sum, the veterans' preference is highly vulnerable to a strict
scrutiny analysis. It could survive the first step of such a test only if
a court were to adopt the most permissive rule still consistent with
the Griggs "business necessity" approach 35 -by holding that a sexually
discriminatory non job-related hiring criterion can be justified by
"compelling social necessity"-and then were to find that the mere
existence of the veteran's transitional (readjustment) period is tanta-
mount to a showing of compelling social necessity. In any event, most
preference statutes would fail to meet the second criterion of the strict
scrutiny test, that there be a close fit between the means and goal.35 4
Whatever the readjustment needs of the typical returning veteran,
they cannot be said to persist throughout his entire lifetime. It would
seem, therefore, that the strict scrutiny test would, at the very least,
require that the preference be pared down to the readjustment period.
The entire preference should be invalidated, however, because veterans
as a class are not socially or economically disadvantaged in any way
sufficient to demonstrate a "compelling social necessity" for the special
treatment accorded them by the preference.
VII. EXAMINATION OF THE VETERANS' PREFERENCE UNDER
A "RATIONAL BASIS" TEST
It seems quite clear that the preference can survive the traditional
relaxed "rational basis" test.355 State preferences have emerged un-
scathed from such an examination in two recent federal cases.3ia Even
though a court might decline to apply a "strict scrutiny" analysis, some
heightened standard of review is appropriate in view of the prefer-
ences' relation back to de jure gender discrimination and the sub-
stantiality of the interest at stake, public employment. 5 7 The con-
353. See text accompanying notes 330-33 supra.
354. See note 114 supra.
355. See note 114 supra. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
356. See Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Koelfgen v.
Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
357. The "right to work" is not, of course, a "fundamental right." See note 114
supra. The dictum of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), has not borne fruit:
"the right to work for a living in the common occupationi of the community is of the
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
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junction of these two factors would seem to warrant the most search-
ing "rational basis" model now available, the "new equal protection"
test described by Professor Gunther: "Judicial deference to a broad
range of conceivable legislative purposes and to imaginable facts that
might justify classifications is strikingly diminished. Judicial tolerance
of overinclusive and underinclusive classifications is notably reduced."3ss
Under such a test, the preference is vulnerable in terms of overin-
clusiveness and inconsistency of legislative goals.
Overinclusive satisfaction of the legislative goals should be con-
sidered a serious defect here because the preference is not a true
"benefit," for which overinclusiveness is a relatively harmless fault3 5 L -
here every exercise of the preference imposes a direct burden on an-
other individual. A true benefit does not impose a direct burden on
any person; its cost is simply the expenditure of public funds. True
veterans' benefits include the "GI Bill" and veterans' pensions. These
benefits may be distributed overinclusively to the extent that they are
enjoyed by those who do not need them. But such overinclusive dis-
tribution is relatively unobjectionable because their conferral does
not impose a detriment on, nor would their withdrawal improve the
relative position of, any other person.360
It was noted earlier361 that the methodology and goals of the civil
service tend to be inconsistent with the concept of the preference and
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2566 (1976) (sustaining mandatory retirement of state police
officers at age 50).
The substantiality of the interest has, however, been reflected in the extent to
which due process has been required upon public job termination, see cases cited note
323 supra, and the extent to which the Court has strained, in other cases, to avoid ques-
tionable restraints on the public employment opportunities of certain discrete classes of
citizens. See notes 324-30 supra & text accompanying notes 324-33 supra. In contrast,
the relaxed standard of review applied in Murgia seems arguably appropriate because
advanced age "marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live our normal span."
96 S. Ct. at 2567.
358. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAuv. L. Rnv. 1, 20 (1972). For a discussion of Gun-
ther's thesis, see Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 632-34 (2d Cir.
1973). In addition to the cases cited by Gunther, supra, see United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The latter two
cases combine elements of substantive due process, equal protection and procedural due
process. See also Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), in
which a three-judge court invalidated the Massachusetts veterans' preference. Anthony
is discussed in text accompanying notes 394-411 infra.
359. For an instance in which overinclusivity was properly considered a constitu-
tionally harmless fault4 see Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
360. See id.
361. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
1976-771
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that the preference is actually or effectively just one of a body of civil
service rules. The civil service approach is one of relative qualifica-
tion, yet the preference is granted so long as the veteran obtains the
minimum passing grade. The goal of civil service competition is to
obtain the best qualified civil servants. Insofar as military service is
not a true job qualification, the purpose of the preference is to reward
veterans for their service without regard to their relative job qualifi-
cation.
Keeping in mind the problems of overinclusivity and inconsistent
purposes, let us now evaluate each of the preference's ostensible goals.
It has repeatedly been asserted that the preference is given in order
to obtain qualified civil servants and that military service is a job
qualification. This rationale is often undercut by an element of over-
inclusivity. The veterans' preference is frequently given to persons
who have never served in the military, namely to "Gold Star" mothers,
widows of deceased veterans and wives of disabled veterans. 0 2 Also,
the degree of the preference is generally increased for disabled vet-
erans.30 3 While there may be legitimate reasons for giving employ-
ment preferences to disabled veterans, disability is not an indicium
of heightened job qualification. Finally, the assertion that military
service is a qualification for all civil service jobs (yet one so impal-
pable that it is not reflected in the veteran's exam score) is sufficiently
implausible to shift to the state the burden of showing that it is true.8?"
It would seem, therefore, that the "job-related qualification" ra-
tionale would not withstand any but the most cursory scrutiny. Fur-
ther, it is possible to argue that if this justification fails, then the pref-
erence fails, because the goal of obtaining the most qualified civil ser-
vants is the only permissible goal of a civil service provision. It has been
observed that the range of constitutionally permissible goals for a given
362. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1967), as amended (Supp. IV 1974); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 31 §§ 23, 23B (Michie 1973).
363. See note 4 supra.
364. While the traditional rational basis test has not been understood to require
that the state substantiate the generalizations that underlie its legislative classifications,
the Court has recently indicated that the state may be required to do so. In United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the Court invalidated
the "anti-hippie" rule that denied food stamps to persons living in households in which
some of the members are unrelated. The government suggested that many persons
living in such households are not really "needy." The Court chided the government
for its failure to "substantiate" this not unreasonable generalization. Id. at 535. See also
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651-57 (1974) (Powell, J, con-
curring); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 689. It is not clear that a majority in
Frontiero would have invalidated the challenged provision had the government proved
that the regulations actually did save money.
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statute is often narrower than the range of proper legislative goals. 365
Thus, for example, traffic safety statutes cannot properly be concerned
with promoting certain kinds of delivery services 66 or subsidizing
agriculture. 67 Additionally, the Supreme Court has shown an increas-
ing tendency sharply to question secondary legislative goals that appear
to be inconsistent with the primary purpose of the legislation.368 While
it is true that this approach tends to ignore the multi-purpose nature
of much legislation,369 it is one that has been used with some degree
of success.
The second legislative goal, that of rewarding veterans, is the most
difficult to handle under a "rational basis" analysis. It seems clear that
the state may reward veterans, at least in some ways. But it also seems
only fair that the state should directly shoulder the expense of such
rewards. There can be no objection to true veterans' benefits, those
that come out of the public treasury. There seems, however, gross un-
365. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YAI. L.J. 1205, 1222-28 (1970); cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895
(1976), discussed in note 141 supra.
366. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), discussed in
Ely, supra note 365, at 1226 n.68.
367. See Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931), discussed in Ely, supra note 365,
at 1225-26. See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), dis-
cussed in note 368 infra.
368. Thus in Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the Court paid little attention to the
govermment's legitimate interest in avoiding "abuse" of the food stamp program when
the effect of the challenged provision was to deny benefits to some needy persons and
it was the primary purpose of the statute to aid needy persons. In Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972), the Court declined to consider the
proffered state goal of discouraging illegitimacy, noting that it "bears . . . no sig-
nificant relationship to those recognized purposes . . . which workmen's compensation
statutes commendably serve." See generally New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill,
411 U.S. 619 (1973); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Coma. 1972), aff'd
mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). See also the discussion of Reed and Frontiero in The
Supreme Court-1972 Term, 87 H. v. L. Rv. at 124 (1973), and of Reed in Getman,
The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. CT. Rav. 157,
162.
369. For persuasive criticism of this approach, see Legislative Purpose, Rationality,
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972). Yet note how difficult it is to recon-
cile the general purpose of civil service rules and the purposes of the veterans' pref-
erence in accordance with the author's model of multi-purpose definition. The reason
for this may be that unlike true multi-purpose legislation, the veterans' preference is
simply an anomalous rule engrafted onto a pre-existing set of rules. True multi-purpose
legislation reflects a background of policy trade-offs without which there might not have
been any legislation at all. Id. at 144. This aspect of political feasibility is what prompts
courts to refrain from searching examination of apparently inconsistent purposes. See,
e.g., Von Stauffenberg v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., 459 F.2d 1128, 1130(D.C. Cir. 1972); Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd
mem., 403 U.S. 901 (1971). This is not, however, a problem with the veterans'
preference. It was not a policy trade-off for the (generally pre-existing) set of merit-
oriented civil service rules.
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fairness in satisfying the public's desire to express gratitude at the very
heavy expense of a comparatively small group of individuals.
It is not clear that this objection is obviated by the state's alterna-
tive argument that the true goal of the reward is not satisfaction of
the public need to express gratitude but rather the creation of an in-
centive for military bravery, obedience and enlistment.3Y0 While there
may be a more substantial public purpose in this goal than in gratifi-
cation of public sentimental feeling, the essential unfairness remains.
Unlike the job-qualification and readjustment goals, there seems to be
no nexus between the motive to reward and the form that the reward
takes, the job preference. Why a reward at the expense of a few when
any other sort of reward would do? One might argue that the prefer-
ence, unlike other "rewards," is so contingent a possibility for the
soldier or prospective enlistee that, for constitutional purposes, the goal
(bravery, obedience, enlistment) is too attenuated to support the
means (the preference). 37 Or, one might assert that because there is
no special nexus between the goal and the means, the state should
confine itself to the variety of less onerous means, including bonuses,
pensions, and tax rebates. 72 It is true, of course, that the duty to utilize
alternate means is generally reserved for "strict scrutiny" 78 cases. Yet
the Supreme Court has occasionally used it in "rational basis"8 74 cases.
370. In many instances, this more refined "incentive" rationale may not even be
available to the state because the preferences have typically been enacted or updated
after the period of the veterans' service. Thus the Massachusetts statutes, discussed in
text accompanying notes 44-45 supra and in note 51 supra, created a preference for
Civil War veterans long after that war had ended. The federal preference was in-
itiated for returning veterans as World War II was drawing to a close. See note 38
supra & accompanying text. See also Brief for Plaintiffs at 184-85, Anthony v. Massa-
chusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976).
371. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). But 'C.
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), sustaining a statutory exclusion of certain
"alternative service" conscientious objectors from "GI Bill" educational benefits. The
Court found it reasonable to believe such benefis would encourage enlistment and
make draftees better soldiers. GI educational benefits are, of course, less contingent
than veterans' preferences.
372. It may also be noted that in terms of the reward rationale alone, the
preference is underinclusive. The reward goes only to those who desire and meet
minimum qualifications for civil service jobs. This defect, however, is characteristic of
most veterans' benefits--for example, the "GI Bill" helps only those who wish further
education; VA mortgages benefit only those who desire and can afford a house.
Standing alone, underinclusivity does not seem a significant defect. In the context of
assessing alternative means, however, the fact that the measure does not even effec-
tively accomplish iU ostensible goal would seem to tip the balance in favor of
utilizing less onerous means.
373. See note 114 supra.
374. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); cases cited note 358
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Some of the recent sex cases375 may also be explained in terms of a
duty to utilize less onerous means. It may be, however, at least under
a "rational basis" analysis, that rewarding veterans at the expense of a
few is terribly unfair but constitutionally permissible.
It is difficult to forecast judicial treatment of the final legislative
goal-aiding veterans to adjust to civilian life-without reference to
the history of the particular challenged preference. A reviewing court
may be unwilling to attribute this goal to the legislature if authorita-
tive pronouncements of the state judiciary neglect 76 or repudiate377
such a goal, or if the preference was enacted when there were no re-
turning veterans. Assuming, however, that a reviewing court is willing
to attribute to the legislature the goal of helping veterans readjust to
civilian life, then the means are constitutionally defective. The pref-
erence is overinclusive in that it lasts the veteran's entire lifetime. If
readjustment were adjudged the only sustaining goal, the net result
would probably be judicially required legislative curtailment of the
duration of the preference to the maximum amount of time that could
reasonably be understood to represent a readjustment period.378
In summary, the prospect of challenging preferences under the
"rational basis" standard is less than promising. The possibilities of
success lie in persuading the court to define narrowly the range of
permissible legislative goals, to decline to attribute unarticulated goals
to the legislature, to look to the actual history of the preference pro-
vision, and to treat both overinclusivity and underinclusivity as serious
defects.
VIII. A PROBLEM OF REMEDIES
Assuming that the essential fault of the preference lies in its sex-
ually discriminatory impact, it might appear that the proper remedy is
not to abolish the preference entirely but merely to devise a system in
supra. These cases, however, all involved provisions unlike the veterans' preference. In
each case, the statute's underlying purpose was frustrated by the challenged provision;
that is, the constitutionally defective section was underinclusive in that it denied bene-
fits to those whom the statute was generally intended to serve.
375. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
376. Cf. Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1971).
377. Consider the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach, discussed in text ac-
companying notes 63-68 supra.
378. See Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 IF. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), discussed
in text accompanying notes 394-411 infra.
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which its sexual impact is neutralized. Should we, therefore, return
to the original Massachusetts concept of granting veterans a "preference
to all other persons, except women"?379 The Massachusetts provision,
however, assumed sex-segregated lists and positions. It would appear
that such a sex-limited preference would be impossible to implement
today. Assume, for example, three job applicants for one position. The
first, a male non-veteran, earns a score of 90. The second, a female
non-veteran, earns a score of 88. The third, a male veteran, earns a
raw score of 86 but is entitled to a veteran's preference of five points.
Who is first on the final list?
This sort of problem is actually present in every fair employ-
ment case in which it is asserted that some job test or other hiring
criterion has a discriminatory impact upon a protected group. Since
the objection is not merely that the criterion is not job validated but
also (necessarily) that the use of the criteron results in discriminatory
impact, it would seem possible to preserve the criterion with respect
to those who cannot claim any discriminatory impact. Yet the courts
frame broad remedial orders that seem to grant a windfall to those
beyond plaintiff's class.88 0 Such windfall results are actually necessary
to avoid new litigation. Since impact is a comparative standard, the
lifting of an onerous burden solely from a disadvantaged group neces-
sarily means that the previously advantaged group is now disadvan-
taged. Thus, for example, while a uniform minimum height and
weight requirement will almost certainly advantage men, the exemp-
tion solely of women from such a requirement will disadvantage men.
This would be true if operation of the veterans' preference were re-
stricted to competitions among male applications. Male non-veterans,
60 percent of the adult male working population, could legitimately
complain that the veterans' preference and the exemption for women
combine discriminatorily to limit the employment opportunity of
males. In conclusion, the apparent impossibility of fashioning a work-
able remedy solely for women and the conceptual problem of creating
a new disadvantaged class by eliminating a job requirement for only
379. Act of June 9, 1896, ch. 517, §§ 2, 6, 1896 Mass. Acts 534.
380. See, e.g., the order in Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d at 737, that the racially
discriminatory exam be scrapped and replaced by a new job validated test. This order
benefited many persons who are not "mainstream white," as well as those mainstream
whites who are otherwise qualified but cannot, for some reason, pass the old test. Id.
at 730. (Castro, of course, appears to have been wrongly decided. See note 180 supra
& text accompanying notes 155-84 supra. This does not, however, affect the appro-
priateness of such an order in a proper case.)
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the currently disadvantaged class indicate that the proper remedy is
total invalidation of the preference.
IX. RECENT LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE PREFERENCE
AS SEXUALLY DISCRIMINATORY
In the past four years, three efforts 10- have been made to challenge
a state veterans' preference on the basis of its discriminatory impact
on women's public employment opportunities. In Koelfgen v. Jack-
son,381 the claim that the Minnesota absolute preference had a disparate
impact on women's public employment opportunities did not survive
the court's consolidation of all the various classes of plaintiffs into one
class, "[a]ll those non-veterans who have been denied employment
solely because of the operations of the Veterans Preference provi-
sions .... "1882
In Feinerman v. Jones,383 the plaintiff was a woman who had been
hired provisionally as an "information writer" in the Pennsylvania
Department of Education. She later took the Civil Service Test and
received a score of 91.57, the second highest grade. But, because of
the application of the ten-point bonus granted to any veteran receiving
a passing grade, she was not among the three highest-ranking eligibles
certified to the appointing authority to fill the position,3 4 and, there-
fore, she was dismissed from her job. She challenged the preference
as de facto discrimination, using the since-discredited constitutionalized
Griggs analysis.38 5 The three-judge court found that she had failed
to make an adequate showing of discriminatory impact. What she had
shown was that "[o]f the total females appointed [to civil service po-
sitions], a little over two percent were veterans while approximately
35 percent of the males appointed were veterans: 38 6 In light of the
evidence that almost 48 percent of the total number of civil service
appointees were women, the court deemed fatal the plaintiff's failure
to show how many women had been deprived of positions because of the
preference and how many men had received their job on account of the
380.1 See Author's Note (t) following this article.
381. 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
Koelfgen is discussed in text accompanying notes 312-13 supra.
382. 355 F. Supp. at 248.
383. 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
384. The "rule of three" is discussed in notes 63 supra & 388 infra.
385. See text accompanying notes 94-184 supra.
386. 356 F. Supp. at 261.
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preference.387 The court's skepticism about the existence of substantial
impact seems disingenuous in the context of a ten-point preference and
a maximum raw grade of 100. Absent evidence that many better paid
jobs were truly non-competitive (that there were as many openings as
qualified applicants), an inference of substantial impact seems unavoid-
able. If women were not in fact applying for jobs from which they were
historically barred by operation of the ten-point preference, it would
be unfair to conclude that there had been no impact on female job
opportunities. In such case, the negative impact simply occurred at a
time prior to application.388
In any event, the court's proof requirements were erroneous.
While the standard of review triggered by a showing of racial or sex-
ual impact will depend on a number of variables,3 9 the definition of
racial or sexual impact does not fluctuate with those variables. The
issue is: What percentage of plaintiff's group possesses the required
characteristic and what percentage of the comparison group has it?
Thus, in Washington v. Davis,390 a showing that four-times as many
blacks as whites failed the policeman's exam was considered adequate
to support a finding of disparate racial impact despite the government's
showing that the percentage of blacks ultimately chosen for training
closely approximated their representation in the relevant population.39 1
387. Id.
388. To require that plaintiff show that many women have applied for and been
denied certain male-female competitive positions raises the strong possibility that prior
sex discrimination, in various forms, will undercut plaintiff's case. Women, like blacks,
should be presumed to know that certain jobs are effectively unavailable to them, and
to act accordingly. Thus, in the area of race discrimination, it has never been a defense
to an employer's utilization of racially discriminatory employment criteria that blacks,
in any event, seldom or never applied for the job. See, e.g., Cypress v. Newport News
Gen. & Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967); Lea v. Cone
Mills Co., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
One study may indicate that the "rule of three," which allows the appointing au-
thority to fill a single position with any one of the three highest-rated candidates, also
has operated to exclude women from positions considered suitable for men. New York
Women, A Report and Recommendation from the Governor's Committee, State of
New York 53 (1964). Knowledge of this practice should be imputed to potential
female applicants. Additionally, social attitudes have long discouraged women from
applying for jobs considered suitable for males. To permit the result of such attitudes
effectively to undercut the case of a woman who does wish to make such application
seems clearly incorrect.
389. See text accompanying notes 74-298 supra. Briefly, those variables include:
whether the challenge is based on Title VII or the equal protection clause; whether
a showing of state intent to cause the discriminatory impact has been made; and
whether the impact (de facto) discrimination is a direct result of a related de jure
discrimination.
390. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
391. See note 304 supra & text accompanying notes 301-09 supra.
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Also of interest in Feinerman was the court's apparent acceptance
of the state's assertion that "the Armed Forces are open to all
women '2 92 and its consequent failure to give any weight to prior de
jure discrimination in the armed forces. Finally, assuming arguendo
that plaintiffs had made out a case of impact discrimination, the court
resolved that the test of mere rationality was the appropriate standard
of review.2 93 In view of its appraisal of the practices of the armed
services, this determination was correct.
The most carefully mounted and documented case to date, An-
thony v. Massachusetts,394 was successful in its challenge to the Massa-
chusetts absolute veterans' preference. The three-judge court split,
two-to-one, 395 in its decision to invalidate the preference. The rather
lengthy opinion records the ruminations of a liberal court searching
for a theory that would disallow a seemingly socially outrageous result.
While legislative declassification of most of the plaintiffs' jobs3 96
made the veterans' preference inapplicable and mooted their cases, the
demonstration of the impact of the absolute preference on these rela-
tively desirable job classifications seems to have had a dramatic effect
upon the court397
Plaintiff Anthony is an attorney who was a provisional appointee
to a state counsel position. When a state-wide exam398 was announced,
she was required to take it for permanent appointment to the position
of Counsel I, in which category nineteen jobs were available. She
received a grade of 94, which tied her with several others for the high-
est score. She was, however, ultimately ranked 77th on the list, behind
76 veterans, all of whom were men and 74 of whom had lower scores
on the unassembled exam. She was joined by plaintiff Noonan who
had also received a grade of 94 and who at the time of the exam, al-
though having been hired to perform all the duties of counsel in the
392. 356 F. Supp. at 260.
393. Id. at 261.
394. 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976), appeal filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3163 (U.S.
Aug. 23, 1976) (No. 76-265). The case was in fact a consolidation of two cases,
Anthony v. Massachusetts, Civ. A. No. 74-5061-T, and Feeney v. Massachusetts, Civ.
A. No. 75-1991-T. The Anthony claim was held moot. 415 F. Supp. at 495.
395. District Judge Tauro authored the opinion in which Circuit Judge Campbell
joined. District Judge Murray concurred in finding Anthony moot and dissented on the
merits in Feeney.
396. 415 F. Supp. at 492-95.
397. Id. at 497-98.
398. The examination was an "unassembled exam," one which does not utilize
"pencil and paper" testing. Instead, evaluative criteria included educational credentials,
prior work experience and professional recommendations.
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State Labor Relations Commission, had instead been offered and had
accepted an inferior appointment as Labor Relations Examiner0 0 in
order to avoid the imminent operation of the preference in the state-
wide Counsel I exam. Anthony and Noonan were joined by another
similarly situated female applicant, Gittes.
Plaintiff Feeney had served the Commonwealth since 1963. She
had an extensive history of unhappy experience in her efforts to rise
to a position worthy of her apparently considerable abilities. She was
always high on the examination list but was never certified because
of the operation of the preference. The preference ultimately cost her
not only her opportunity for advancement but also her opportunity for
state employment because during the pendency of the suit she was laid
off from the civil service job to which the preference had confined her,
and she was still unemployed a year later. To demonstrate that their
experience was not atypical, the plaintiffs submitted fifty other recent
eligible lists, all of which showed similar losses by women of certifica-
tion opportunities that they would have had but for the operation of
the preference. While women had received 43 percent of all appoint-
ments made from 1963-1973, the state defendants conceded that they
were generally hired as clerks and secretaries, low-status and low-pay
positions for which men rarely apply. The court found that "[i]n prac-
tical application, the combination of federal military enrollment
regulations with the Veterans' Preference is a one-two punch that ab-
solutely and permanently forecloses, on average, 98 percent of this
state's women from obtaining significant civil service appointments." 40
Plaintiffs documented the extent and pervasiveness of de jure sex
discrimination in the armed forces, both in terms of initial entry and
conditions of service. Although the court dwelt at length on this evi-
dence and treated it as a highly salient feature of the operation of the
preference, it did not make clear its constitutional significance. This
lack of clarity is probably due to the court's (retrospectively) errone-
ous failure to differentiate between de jure discrimination, which is
explicitly sex-based, and de facto discrimination, which merely involves
the disparate impact of facially neutral criteria. The court, following
399. This discrepancy between job title and actual job duties is often challenged
as a form of explicitly sex-based discrimination. For example, among persons perform-
ing the same duties, males are often classified as higher paid "administrative assistants"
and women as lower paid "secretaries." Ironically, in this case under-classification was
necessary to save plaintiff's job from another form of sex discrimination.
400. 415 F. Supp. at 498.
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its own circuit's NAACP v. Beecher,401 merged the two forms of dis-
crimination and applied a fairly rigorous standard of review, even
though it neither concluded that the "one-two punch" rendered the
preference de jure sex discrimination nor made a finding that there
had been any legislative intent to exclude women from civil service
positions.402
If the court believed it was dealing with a simple impact case, its
standard of review was too rigorous. 4°3 There is, however, ample lan-
guage indicating that the court believed that in operation the prefer-
ence more closely resembled a sex-based than a facially neutral cri-
terion:
Theoretically, women are not barred from qualifying as preferred
veterans. Yet, the formula's impact, triggered by decades of restric-
tive federal enlistment regulations, makes the operation of the Vet-
erans' Preference in Massachusetts anything but an impartial, neutral
policy of selection, with merely an incidental effect on the oppor-
tunities for women.4°4
If the court did in fact conclude that the criterion was sex-based, then
it applied an appropriate standard of review. 40 5
The court made short shrift of the rationale that the preference
is job related, that is, that military service is a job qualification. It
noted that "[o]n the contrary, it suspends the application of . . .
job-related criteria and substitutes a formula that relegates demon-
strable professional qualifications to a secondary position, absolutely
and permanently."40 6 More problematic were the reward and read-
justment rationales. With respect to both, the court inquired whether
there were alternative or less onerous means407 of rewarding veterans
and providing readjustment assistance. With respect to the first goal,
it is clear that there are many more direct and effective means of re-
warding citizens for military service. Regarding readjustment assistance,
the court found the lifetime preference durationally overbroad and
401. 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
402. The court explicitly found the contrary. 415 F. Supp. at 495.
403. See text accompanying notes 155-246 supra.
404. 415 F. Supp. at 495.
405. See text accompanying notes 247-97 supra.
406. 415 F. Supp. at 497.
407. While this query is generally considered the third part of the "strict scrutiny"
test, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, utilized it as part of the lesser "strict
rationality" test, effectively using the inquiry to determine whether there is a con-
stitutionally adequate nexus between the legislature's goal and its means. See note 114
sup ra & text accompanying notes 371-76 supra.
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thus excessively onerous. It suggested that a time limit and diminu-
tion of the extent of the preference might render it constitutional.408
While a time limit would obviate the problem of overinclusiveness
with respect to the goal of readjustment assistance, it is not clear that
a five- or ten-point preference would be any more acceptable than an
absolute preference. As the dissent pointed out, application of a five-
point preference would have disqualified Ms. Feeney, the only plaintiff
whose case was not rendered moot, as surely as the absolute prefer-
ence.400 Even if a reduction in the amount of the preference would
effect a corresponding diminution of the veterans' preference's overall
impact on women's public job opportunities, the amount of the pref-
erence ought not to have any constitutional import if some substantial
negative impact remains. Assuming arguendo that the readjustment
rationale would support a short-term preference for returning veterans,
the fact that a five-point preference might be "less onerous" for women
is not constitutionally significant because a reduced preference would
also be less effective in accomplishing the legislative goal of easing
readjustment to civilian life. The degree of onerousness becomes a
consideration only when the state goal could be accomplished equally
well by a short-term preference. To say, without reference to legisla-
tive purpose, that a point system would be "less onerous" than an
absolute preference is not a constitutionally adequate reason for re-
jecting the latter while approving the former.
This shortcoming of the court's analysis does not, however, detract
from the correctness of its decision. The only legislative purpose that
could not be achieved by alternative means was readjustment assis-
408. 415 F. Supp. at 499.
On August 23, 1976, Francis X. Bellotti, the Massachusetts Attorney General,
filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 45 U.S.L.W. 3163
(U.S.) (No. 76-265). The Attorney General represented in his jurisdictional statement
that the appeal was filed on behalf of the Massachusetts Personnel Administrator and
Civil Service Commission, the state officers against whom the trial court judgment was
entered. The Administrator and the Commission subsequently advised the Supreme
Court that the appeal was without their authorization and against their wishes. In
addition, the Governor of Massachusetts requested the Attorney General not to appeal
the district court judgment. The Supreme Court, on its own motion, certified to the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts the question of whether Massachusetts law
allows the Attorney General to prosecute the appeal without the consent and against
the will of the state officers against whom the judgment was entered. Massachusetts v.
Feeney, 45 U.S.L.W. 3343 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1976).
409. 415 F. Supp. at 507 n.14. In combination with a time limitation, however, the
impact on women might be much less severe. In a conversation with this author, plaintiff




tance, and that goal was too narrow to support a lifetime preference.
The court's gratuitous reference to an alternative point system does,
however, raise the question of how a court ought to deal with a care-
fully tailored provision that serves the goal of readjustment both as
narrowly and as effectively as possible. Since such a provision ought to
satisfy the "no alternative or less onerous means" test, a court would
have to decide whether the relationship between the preference and
federal de jure discrimination is such as effectively to render the pref-
erence a form of de jure discrimination, and, if so, whether it is ap-
propriate to characterize de jure discrimination against women as
"suspect" for equal protection purposes. If a court so concludes, it
would then be appropriate for it to evaluate the legislative goal in
terms of the "compelling social necessity" test discussed earlier in this
article.4 10
Even though the invalidated Massachusetts provision was atypical,
insofar as it provided an absolute rather than a point preference,
Anthony v. Massachusetts is not limited to absolute preferences, because
what the court found fatal was the preference's durational aspect. Like
the Massachusetts preference, virtually all state and federal prefer-
ences411 last for the life of the veteran. If readjustment assistance is the
only state goal capable of supporting the preference in view of its
sexually discriminatory effect, then all veterans' preferences are equally
vulnerable to the argument that they are durationally overbroad.
X. CONCLUSION
The veterans' preference in civil service employment survived its
litigious beginning to become a generally accepted and little discussed
fact of American life. Recent statutory and constitutional developments
make it appropriate to reconsider the preference from a new perspec-
tive. In the terminology of fair employment practice law, the prefer-
ence is a sexually discriminatory job requirement because the char-
acteristic of being a veteran appears frequently and almost exclusively
in the male population. This sexually discriminatory impact seems
particularly objectionable in view of its relation back to explicitly
sex-based discrimination against women by the armed forces and the
410. See text accompanying notes 316-54 sup ra.
411. See notes 4-5 supra. Some preferences may, however, be claimed only once




patent lack of relationship between military service and civil service
job qualification.
Of the two modes of curtailing or eliminating the preference,
legislation and litigation, this paper has focused on the latter because
veterans form a very powerful lobby.4 2 But the equal protection argu-
ment, as this article indicates, is not a simple one. Constitutional cur-
tailment or invalidation of a state preference requires favorable resolu-
tion of a series of as yet unresolved issues. Restriction or elimination
of such preferences would, however, seem consistent with the premise
underlying the major sex discrimination cases of this decade: gender-
based legal classifications may not operate to curtail women's oppor-
tunities for full participation in economic, social and political life.t
412. While a hypothetical legislature considering, for the first time, the desirability
of an employment preference for veterans might reject such a proposal because it
would undercut other legislative efforts to ensure women equal public job opportunities,
including equal pay and fair employment practices acts, it seems unrealistic to expect
legislatures to repeal existing preferences and thereby incur the wrath of politically
active veterans groups, particularly when, as here, there is no fiscal savings incentive.
As discussed in text accompanying notes 40-41 supra, the preference is highly eco-
nomical: it imposes no direct or measurable costs on the public treasury.
t Author's Note. After this article went to press, Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp.
1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976), was reported. In Branch, a three-judge court sustained an
Illinois statute that gave up to 3 / additional points to veterans applying for promotion
in the Chicago Police Department. Anthony and Branch are discussed in Comment,
Veteran? Public Employment Preference as Sex Discrimination: Anthony v. Massa-
chusetts and Branch v. Du Bois, 90 HAv. L. RFv. 805 (1977). Anthony is also dis-
cussed in Note, Veterans' Preference in Public Employment: The History, Constitution-
ality, and Effect on Federal Personnel Practices of Veterans Preference Legislation, 44
Gao. WAsH. L. Rnv. 623, 639-40 (1976).
With respect to the meaning of the term "intent" and the significance of related
de jure discrimination, discussed in text accompanying notes 155-277 supra, see Austin
Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976) (per curiam, with a con-
curring opinion by Powell, J.), vacating and remanding United States v. Texas Educ.
Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
See also Fleming & Shanor, Veterans Preferences in Public Employment: Uncon-
stitutional Gender Discrimination?, 26 EhioRY L.J. -(Winter 1977, forthcoming).
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